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ABSTRACT
Early termination (or cancellation) in construction is generally regarded as an
unpleasant and costly last-resort control technique in the contractual relationship
between the owner and the contractor, when their differences cannot be reconciled
otherwise. Normally, construction contracts contain clauses that empower the owner
to terminate if the contractor materially breaches the contract (i.e., termination for
default) or if the project ceases to be in the benefit of the owner (i.e., termination
for convenience). However, even if the owner has sufficient reason to terminate a
contract, its doing so will not always result in higher benefits than if the contract had
been allowed to complete. Part of the reason is the extensive litigation that
traditionally follows termination decisions and its uncertain outcomes.
In this work, construction contract termination decision is examined from the owner's
viewpoint. A review of the termination literature for research and development
projects is performed. The legal and contractual treatment of construction
termination is examined, mainly for two standard contract documents used in the US
today: the American Institute of Architects (AIA) Standard Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Contractor and the Federal Government Construction Contract. Two
frameworks for monitoring construction contracts for the possibility of termination are
developed: One for default and one for convenience. Finally, in search for a decision
support framework and after examination of the appropriateness of various decision
models for initiating contract termination, the multi-attribute utility model with
decision tree analysis is explored. The use of the monitoring framework is illustrated
with a idealized example based on a real case study.
Thesis Supervisor: Feniosky Pena-Mora
Title: Associate Professor of Civil a Environmental Engineering
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1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
This work examines construction contracts terminated before completion. The
focus is on occasions that the owner cancels its contract with the prime
contractor. This work seeks to examine how termination is a control instrument
in the hands of the owner, its value as such, and the factors for decision-
making in using it.
Legally and fundamentally, there exist two modes of contract termination:
Termination for default of the contractor, and termination for convenience of
the owner. In certain contracts, the contractor is also allowed to cancel a
contract. Both convenience termination and termination for default constitute
a project control mechanism, although quite a rare, costly and undesirable
one.
Termination for default is the last control instrument the owner has in response
to a contractor who breaches (or is likely to breach) the performance
requirements set on the contract. The laws provide plenty of other ways of
insurance or remedy for the owner in case the contract is breached. However,
contract provisions alone cannot always account for all the different cases of
contractor non-performance. Also, these provisions often only act as a
deterrent for the contractor not to breach the contract, and do not account for
all compensation to the actual stakes of the owner. Finally, the complicated
legal system makes termination decisions very complex and risky, providing
little assurance that the intended result will be achieved by this control
mechanism.
Termination for convenience is the owner's right to terminate a contract
regardless of the contractor's performance. The drivers for such a decision are
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more often related to managerial and strategic issues regarding the project. In
those cases, decision-making for termination in the construction industry
shares similar principles with other industries, research and development
projects in particular. There exists extensive literature about the decision to
cancel research and development projects, and the decision support models
used can be extrapolated into the construction industry, at least in part.
These models, both the ones for default termination and for convenience (or
strategic termination), usually make use of statistical information relevant to
other similar projects, decisions, and outcomes. This approach is inadequate in
the case of default construction contract termination and strategic termination
equally. The main reason is that they don't account for either legal and
administrative issues, for the unique misalignment of interest experienced by
the players in the construction industry, or the parameter of time (or else,
waiting until more information is available). Therefore, construction contract
termination needs to be evaluated with another approach.
Contract termination, even though a drastic measure, is a control instrument in
both cases, strategic or for default. As such, it must be incorporated into a
project management framework used by the development organization of the
owner. Furthermore, termination itself must be evaluated, organized, planned,
monitored and controlled.
How does the event of termination fit into the project management framework
for construction development? How is it interpreted and used as a control
instrument? How is termination itself evaluated, organized, planned, monitored
and controlled? Answers to these questions are the main topic of this work.
1.2 THE EOPMCL FRAMEWORK
The event of early termination should be part of the project management
framework of a project, especially for long-lasting, technically and financially
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demanding projects that exceed both the normal and historical capabilities of
the development organizations as well as the owner's, and sociopolitical
context's experiences.
The framework used is abbreviated as the EOPMCL project management
framework: Project development is a continuous and iterative process of
Evaluating, Organizing, Planning, Monitoring, Controlling and Learning. The
choice and evaluation of a project in the context of the parent organization's
strategic goals and the ecosystem, is the goal of the initiating phase in
managing the product development process, Project Evaluation. The design of
the development organization, the definition of the project organization, the
team formation and the selection of the project manager are included in the
Organization phase. Planning includes all the implementation activities as they
are described in an established work breakdown structure, the work definition
and the justification of the specifications. Monitoring, which belongs to the
development stage, refers to tracking project performance. Controlling
includes the necessary actions needed to minimize observed deviations from
the cost, schedule and quality requirements. Contract termination is clearly a
control instrument for the project: it is the owner's last resort and hope of
correcting project deviations with respect to cost, quality and schedule, while
controlling the interaction of the project with its natural and sociopolitical
environment. Within the EOPMCL framework, contract termination requires:
o Organization (e.g., staffing and assigning responsibilities and decision
power).
o Evaluation (by enumerating possible scenarios and assessing their utility
to the organization and likelihood of occurring).
o A plan (i.e., an assessment of the risks and a map of the procedures to
be followed in every case, usually by designing the contract).
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o A monitoring system (e.g., comparing contractor or project
performance with the tactical or strategic goals of the project, or by
comparing how a single dispute or breach can invoke termination), and
finally,
o Learning (because contract termination is not a simple procedure, and
the organization will have plenty of lessons to extract from such
situations).
The event of contract termination follows project development throughout its
life cycle (Figure 1.2-1).
EVALUATE
LEAr
LEARN ORG
PROJECT
CONTROL P
EVALUATE
MONITOR'*0e
N ORGANIZE
CONTRACT
TERMINATION--..
CUNTROL P
MONITOR
ANIZE
LAN
LAN
FIGURE 1.2-1: CONTRACT TERMINATION AS A POSSIBLE CONTROL INSTRUMENT
1.3 SCOPE OF WORK
To answer the question of how construction contract cancellation is evaluated,
this work needs to cover related issues, such as:
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1. Project cancellation in other industries and projects (mainly research
and development, R&D)
2. Examination of contract law related to breach and cancellation.
3. Proposition of a set of elements of value that need to be monitored,
and should enter the discussion about cancellation.
4. A qualitative and quantitative framework for valuating the decision to
cancel a construction contract. For illustration, a recent and relevant
case study is presented and examined within the framework developed.
1.3.1PROJECT CANCELLATION IN OTHER INDUSTRIES AND PROJECTS
While successful completion and the subsequent "natural" death of projects is
the goal around which all project management literature evolves, managers are
often faced with projects with apparently little hope of delivering value. The
subsequent dilemma of pursuing or canceling such an endeavor is easy when
the project is largely unsuccessful, the salvage value is high and exit is easy.
The call is harder in research and development projects that are characterized
by great uncertainty, risk, vaguely defined budget and schedule, and are
largely influenced by external and socio-political factors.
Incomplete projects are terminated by means of an intervention. There have to
exist driving forces to the decision of terminating an ongoing project, as well as
criteria for evaluating those drivers. The drivers for this decision are analyzed,
and ways to evaluate their significance are also mentioned as concisely as
possible, so as to serve as a guide for the decision to cancel a project. The
management can identify which of the drivers are relevant to the project, and
finally come up with an estimate of the overall value of the project to the
organization, its potential for success and whether it should be continued or
not.
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Some knowledge and experience from early cancellation in fast-paced
industries can be transferred to construction. Although the two worlds are
entirely different, a construction contract cancellation framework may build on
the experience and methods developed for R&D projects.
1 .3.2CONTRACTUAL & LEGAL TREATMENT OF CANCELLATION
Most construction contracts nowadays contain clauses empowering the owner
to invoke cancellation, either for its convenience or for default of the
contractor. These clauses, even expressed in legal language as they are, are
fairly straight-forward. However, the legal implications and complications of
cancellation are, in reality, very vague.
Various other contractual clauses and common laws affect legal decisions
regarding the rightfulness of cancellation. This, along with the fact that most
cancellations (especially for default) lead to litigation, poses significant risks
for the owner who wishes to terminate a contract.
These issues are addressed in Chapter 3 in fair detail, in order to provide a set
of elements of uncertainty which must be accounted for in the evaluation for
cancellation.
1 .3.3A MONITORING FRAMEWORK FOR CONTRACT CANCELLATION
In the construction industry, the context of project development, and
therefore, of contract cancellation, has unique characteristics. Even for
cancellation for convenience, which in principle should be similar to other
industries, there is usually a significant capital commitment in land and effort
before a contract as cancelled. The driving factors for construction contract
cancellation are very different than in other industries.
A set of factors driving construction contract cancellation is derived, of similar
format and potential usefulness as the frameworks already developed for
research and development projects. The framework for construction projects is
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two-fold, to account for the fundamentally different modes termination is
encountered in: for default of the contractor or for the convenience of the
owner.
1 .3.4A DECISION MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT TERMINATION
Decision models for the evaluation of R&D projects for cancellation have
already been developed in the literature, and the most significant are reviewed
herein. However, the construction world presents differences that cannot
potentially be dealt with, using these models. These differences will be
analyzed in Chapter 4.
Because of these differences, an effort to provide a suitable framework for
construction contract cancellation is made, which is as adopted to the
construction world realities as possible. The framework presented consists of a
monitoring scheme for termination factors (both for convenience and for
default), and decision support using multi-attribute utility functions in a
decision analysis and influence diagrams model.
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Research and development (R&D) projects are characterized by great risk and
uncertainty. The sources of risk and uncertainty derive from various special
elements of the research and development industry: R&D projects involve
technical uniqueness and innovation, and the outcomes often do not live up to
the original standards and expectations. Furthermore, these projects are often
developed in high-speed, short life cycle markets. Often, the R&D effort is
obsolete before it is complete, either because of radical changes in
competitors' technology, market conditions, technology costs etc. Finally,
successful R&D efforts may simply be not marketable, which is often seen
shortly before the completion of the project and could lead to its cancellation.
These special characteristics of the R&D project ecosystem can be translated
into "driving forces" for project early termination.
Driving forces can be promoting project cancellation whether rightfully or not,
or they can be opposing it. Both modes have been the subject of a fair amount
of management research for frameworks for risk assessment and decision
support systems. The following sections summarize relevant research on
cancellation of R&D projects.
2.1 DRIVERS FOR R&D PROJECT CANCELLATION
The driving forces that lead to premature termination usually emerge from the
project ecosystem itself. They may be related to the project performance in
terms of cost, quality and time, or they can be related to changes in the value
of the end product to the stakeholders. Moreover, conflicts or changes in key-
personnel morale and beliefs can drive a project to termination. Poor initial
(systems) analysis and planning also accounts for many cancelled projects. The
KONSTANTINOS C. KALLIGEROS PAGE 17 OF 97
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT TERMINATION AS A CONTROL TECHNIQUE
loss of a project's appeal to the market or the stakeholders during its
execution, a lag behind the state of the art or excessive slipping in schedule
are all consequences of poor planning, and can all lead to premature
termination.
In every one of these cases, the dilemma is always between putting more
money into the project or living with the sunk costs and canceling it. There are
reasons (although not always reasonable ones) for managers to pursue either
course of action. The effort in this section is to translate those reasons into
independent criteria where possible.
Research has lead to various categorizations of the variety of factors that
should indicate potential success or failure of the project, and therefore drive
a decision to terminate. Some of them are focused on the organization, other
drivers are inherent to the project environment, the market or the
competition, and others have to do with the project performance itself.
Termination drivers are identified as static and dynamic, the latter being the
ones whose nature or importance changes throughout the life cycle of the
project. The fact that the decision is never entirely rational has lead to the
determination of psychological effects that drive (or rather, oppose) rational
termination. Finally, there have been efforts to isolate those common forces
that drive termination in different industries, countries and corporate cultures.
The identification of a global set of drivers for termination can assist future
decisions in the environment of collaborative and geographically dispersed
project development. Balachandra[3 ], independently compared the drivers of
R&D project termination in four industrial countries. The research was
conducted among organizations in the US, the UK, Germany and Japan,
comparing the most important termination factors and their significance. Table
2.1-1 provides a list of what is regarded as important termination factors by
industries in these technologically advanced and highly industrialized countries,
with similar market economies.
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TABLE 2.1 -1: COMMON FACTORS FOR PROJECT TERMINATION IN THE US, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY
AND JAPAN, (ADOPTED FROM [3])
1 PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS VIA TECH ROUTE
2 DEVIATIONS IN TIME SCHEDULES
3 DEVIATIONS IN COST SCHEDULES
4 TIME OF ANTICIPATED COMPLETION
5 CHANCE EVENTS
6 SMOOTHNESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL ROUTE
7 PRESSURE ON PROJECT LEADER
8 CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
9 CHANGE IN NUMBER OF ENDURES
10 CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT
11 CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF R&D MANAGEMENT
12 CHANGE IN COMMITMENT OF PROJECT LEADER
13 CHANGE IN AVAILABILITY OF EXPERTS
14 STAGE OF LIFECYCLE
15 ADAPTABILITY OF PROJECT LEADER
In addition to this "universal" list of termination factors, there are other
elements of less importance depending on the organizational culture, the
market economy and the intensity of the competition. Some of these factors
are listed in Table 2.1-I.
A direct comparison between the project performance and a standard or a
minimum can be performed for most of the items in Table 2.1-1 and Table
2.1-11, and this should be the basis of decision models for termination. One set
of factors that are not included in Table 2.1-1 is related to the fact that the
decision is made by people, affected by their own pre-occupations, beliefs or
other circumstances in the organization or the project ecosystem. Most of the
time, these factors oppose rational termination.
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TABLE 2.1-Il: SPECIAL DRIVERS FOR PROJECT CANCELLATION
16 THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PROJECT IS WITHIN THE FINANCIAL CAPABILITIES OF THE
ORGANIZATION
17 THE SUPPORT THE PROJECT RECEIVES FROM VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION
18 THE POTENTIAL OF THE PROJECT TEAM FOR INNOVATIVE WORK, IF IT APPLIES TO THE
PROJECT
19 THE ORGANIZATION'S SOPHISTICATION AND POTENTIAL TO FULLY EXPLOIT THE OUTCOMES OF
THE PROJECT.
20 THE PROJECT TEAM'S ENTHUSIASM AND VIGOR WORKING TOWARDS SUCCESS.
21 WHETHER THE ANTICIPATED OUTCOME OF THE PROJECT CAN BE SUBCONTRACTED MORE
EFFECTIVELY.
22 INITIAL AND FINAL STAFF LEVELS.
23 FLEXIBILITY TO RESCHEDULE AND RE-CALCULATE THE BUDGET
2.2 FACTORS OPPOSING RATIONAL TERMINATION
The circumstances causing political opposition towards termination are hard to
identify, evaluate and mitigate, and the relevant factors are not objective.
Nevertheless, they can be very influential.
Managers' motivations for not terminating a project when they should, often
outsource from the "successful manager role model". Managers are often
rewarded for ignoring short-term difficulties and coming through rough times
successfully. They are thus inclined to misinterpret major setbacks in the
project as "bad weather". This perception of successful management can be
further enhanced if failure is viewed with excessive disfavor by the
organization. In organizations that severely "punish" failure, managers usually
tend to favor low-risk projects and refuse to give up on failing ones. The effect
can be seen clearly in projects that go awry slowly: The manager is confronted
with many small setbacks instead of a big disaster, deals with them separately
and fails (or chooses to fail) to see the big picture about the project and its
lack of potential.
KONSTANTINOS C. KALLIGEROS PAGE 20 OF 97
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT TERMINATION AS A CONTROL TECHNIQUE
Failing to recognize a project without hope may also be because the manager
personally believes in it. People, when called to make a judgment, tend to put
additional weight to the factors that add value to their opinion, hope and
beliefs. Managers in similar situations would find reasons to overstress
supporting data and discredit contradictory information, if they are convinced
that a project can be brought back to track.
Finally, declaring a project to have failed will hurt the project manager's ego.
For the manager of a no-hope project, termination is not only equivalent to
admitting that the project failed, but also that they failed to realize it sooner.
Managers are thus committed in the game of continuously trying to justify their
previous decisions, both to themselves and others. And since no one wants to
appear incompetent, job insecurity and lack of supervisor support can only
increase the need for external justification. However, a project manager
seldom has enough decision power to keep a project in life by himself: Other
parameters, larger than the project manager, usually play their role in
supporting a project when they should not.
Factors outsourcing from the organization itself or its environment are often
responsible for impeding withdrawal from losing projects. Perhaps the simplest
of them is administrative inertia. Closing out a project both involves a lot of
extra work and is also such a serious disruption from the daily routine of the
organization, that no one is willing to invoke. Furthermore, projects are
sometimes so closely tied to the marketing value of the organization, that they
are not discontinued even if they are unsuccessful. Termination in such cases
would render the organization unidentified in the market (try to imagine BIC
without razor blades or ball-point pens). The unwillingness of organizations to
give up on such projects can also be seen as some sort of inertia - one against
strategic change. Finally, the socio-political environment may force the
continuation of a project, despite its lack of potential.
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Not all these advocates of the continuation of a project are necessarily present
at the same time, and some may not be applicable at all in some projects.
Often, the factors that affect the decision early in the life cycle of the project
are excessive zeal and enthusiasm, outsourcing from lack of knowledge about
the entire project ecosystem. Psychological and social drivers make themselves
significant earlier than the organizational ones. Commitment to a loser project
builds up slowly, resulting to projects continued so far beyond the logical point
of termination, that completion ultimately becomes the only option even from
a purely rational standpoint.
One way of mitigating the factors opposing rational termination is to include
the option of termination in a life-long monitoring process (e.g., in project
audits). This reminds key personnel that a project is a temporary commitment,
and alleviates the pressure on the managers. Continuous evaluation also
provides a quantitative scale and a basis for comparison for the evaluation of
projects against predefined issues of concern (such as the ones in Table 2.1-
and Table 2.1-11).
2.3 CANCELLATION OF R&D PROJECTS: MONITORING FOR TERMINATION
The items in Table 2.1-1 and Table 2.1-Il are important termination drivers, but
their usefulness in decision-making is limited. The list does not provide
information about the origin of these drivers (organizational, project-oriented,
environmental), their likelihood to evolve during project development (static
or dynamic factors) or their potential for quantification. When implementing a
robust decision process to project termination, it is necessary to elaborate
these factors into categorized and independent criteria, and monitor the
project's performance against them.
Meredith[ 5 proposes a system for monitoring a project and looking out for the
need of early termination (Early Termination Monitoring System, ETMS).
Monitoring occurs in 3 levels (or stages), in the form of audits (Table 2.3-1). In
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the system proposed, the monitoring function is separated from the project's
management. The recipient of the each ETMS report should ideally be the
functional element of the organization responsible for the project selection.
The three "steps" the system refers to, are actually audits conducted in three
different timeframes. Step 1 is essentially a general organizational overview,
conducted independently from any project at infrequent intervals. It has the
purpose of determining the "personality" of the organization in terms of its
attitude towards project cancellation. It should be repeated if there are
suspicions or reasons that this personality has changed, e.g. when key
personnel are replaced.
TABLE 2.3-1: EARLY TERMINATION MONITORING SYSTEM, ETMS (FROM [15])
Encouragement Of Persistence
Penalties For Failure
Job Security
Managerial Support
Organizational Inertia
*. A
2a. Static Project Factors
Prior Experience
Company Image
Political Forces
High Sunk Costs
Intermittent Rewards
Salvage And Closing Costs
Benefits At End
2b. Project Manager Factors
Persistence
Reinforcement Susceptibility
Confronting Mistakes
Information Biasing
Job Security
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.a. uynamic rroject ractors
Review Static Factors:
Prior Experience
Company Image
Political Forces
High Sunk Costs
Intermittent Rewards
Salvage And Closing Costs
Benefits At End
Task - Team:
Difficulty Achieving Technical Performance
Difficulty Solving Technological Or Manufacturing Problems
Time To Completion Lengthening
Missing Project Time Or Performance Milestones
Lowered Team Innovativeness
Loss Of Team Or Project Manager Enthusiasm
Sponsorship:
Project Less Consistent With Organizational Goats
Weaker Linkage With Other Projects
Lower Impact On The Company
Less importance To The Firm
Reduced Problem Or Opportunity
Less To Management Commitment To Project
Loss Of Project Champion
Economics:
Lower Project ROI, ROS, Market Share Or Profit
Higher Cost To Complete Project
Less Capital Availability
Longer Time To Project Returns
Missing Project Cost Milestones
Reduced Match Of Project Financial Scope To The Organization
Environment:
Better Alternatives Available
Increased Competition
Less Able To Protect Results
Increased Government Restrictions
User / Client:
Market Need Obviated
Market Factors Changed
Reduced Market Receptiveness
Decreased Number Of End Use Alternatives
Reduced Likelihood of Successful Commercialization
Less Chance Of Extended Or Continuing Success
3b. Organizational & Managerial Factors
Evaluate Interactions And Progress Of Factors In Steps 1 and 2b
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Step 2 should follow the initiation of every project, and it considers both
organizational and project-oriented aspects, and their interaction. The project
factors considered at this stage are static, in the sense that they reflect
project objectives and can be evaluated before any progress is made.
Stage 3 aims to capture the changes in the dynamic project factors, and how
they interact with the organizational and the static project factors. Apart from
a methodological tool, the proposed system also provides a concise listing of
most of the criteria that should be taken into account for the decision.
Those elements that are inherent to the organization or the manager and
impede proper cancellation of failing projects are mostly of emotional nature
and are also hard to bring out in an organizational audit (Step 1). Assessing
static project factors in a post-initiation audit (Step 2) is easier, as they are
more project-focused and more specific. The organization's prior experience in
the nature of the project enables the manager to evaluate the significance of
difficulties encountered more successfully. It is also important, even if it is
relatively easy, to evaluate the relation of the project to the organization's
market image, and the effect on the latter if the project fails. The political
forces involved must also be identified beforehand. Attempting to terminate a
project in the face of political forces may bring excessive pressure to the
organization.
Such forces play a role in the case of the Deep Tunnel Project. The Deep
Tunnel Project in Chicago is a major attempt to improve the city's ability to
handle major floods by expanding the sewer system. The project is already
significantly over budget and late, with an anticipated completion date
currently in 2012. Canceling the project is now impossible, as its salvage value
is close to zero: No value is delivered to stakeholders unless the project is
complete.
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In projects like the Deep Tunnel, benefits come at the end. This characteristic
has to be identified early, before progress makes termination unacceptable. In
contrast, other projects may deliver intermediate rewards during development,
which can fool the manager into interpreting them as progress towards the end
goals. The intermediate and final goals of a project should be identified early,
so that final success or failure is not examined in view of the "side-products"
of project development. Although goal identification and separation belongs to
initial project proposition and selection, it can be repeated in the post-
initiation audit so that it follows the ETMS throughout the project. Once the
project's and the organization's factors for susceptibility to erroneous decisions
as to project cancellation are identified, they have to be continuously
compared to the dynamic project factors during the life cycle of the project.
The dynamic project factors included in Table 2.3-1 are essentially a list of the
most important reasons for project failure, as they have been identified in the
literature. The term "dynamic" implies the exception of characteristics or
shortcomings of the organization that could lead to project failure; it focuses
attention to the changing and unpredictable components of the project's
ecosystem throughout its lifetime, and to factors whose importance changes
during the life cycle of the project.
The dynamic factors for project success do not necessarily remain equally
significant during the project life cycle, and depending on the time the on-
going audit is conducted, emphasis should be given to the appropriate ones. A
relevant research on contractual projectsJ33 has revealed that during the system
(or conceptual) design phase, successful client consultation and the explicit
establishment of the mission of the project are most important factors for its
success. During the detailed design and planning, top management support also
becomes significant, while the detailed design should also be elaborately
explained to and accepted by the client. In the development phase, the
trouble-shooting methods, the project's accordance to time and cost schedules
and technical requirements, as well as continuous client consultation become
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critical. These factors are only a sample of the large pool of dynamic factors
the on-going audit should take into account.
There are five areas in which the project manager may face unpredictable and
dynamic change - thus five main areas of investigation for the on-going audits
(Step 3):
1. What is considered static and known, such as the static factors of the
second step, may always change (however self-contradictory this may
seem), and on-going audits should check for such changes.
2. The interaction between the work obligations of the project and the
project teams should be examined. The difficulty the teams face resolving
technical objectives or manufacturing problems and their loss of
enthusiasm, innovativeness and commitment, are usually indicated by
missed milestones and continuous stretching of the expected time to
results.
3. The value of the project to the stakeholders needs to be reviewed. If the
project becomes less important to them, their commitment and the
pressure to the organization to complete the project will also drop. Also,
market conditions may change, making the success of the result less likely
in the short or the long run.
4. The fluctuation of pure economic facts about the project should be taken
into account. The projected return on investment (ROI) or sales (ROS),
market share or profit etc., should be compared to the original
expectations and conclusions should be reached.
5. The political and natural environment the project is developed in and its
dynamics should be closely and honestly accounted for. It is important to
identify the ways the project affects them or is vulnerable to changes in
them. Also, it is vital to project and try to predict the state of the
environment at the operational phase of the project.
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The need of comparing all the organizational, project and dynamic factors of
project development in order to obtain an educated cancellation decision has
led to relevant models. Most of these models are quantitative by assigning
values to each of the monitored factors and comparing them to target values or
benchmarking data. Their strength lies in the usage of acquired knowledge and
experience, and in their relative simplicity. On the other hand, some are too
simplistic and do not capture neither the dynamics of project development or
the real option value of decisions and policies. Worse, most termination
evaluation models rely on the evaluators' estimation of scores for the
termination factors, thus enhancing the psychological and organizational
elements mentioned in Section 2.2. These models, as well as alternative
termination evaluation techniques, are presented extensively later in the text.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Contract termination was first introduced in the United States towards the end
of the civil war. The government found itself tied up in multiple contracts for
infrastructure and equipment to support the military operations, when the war
ended and the need for the contracted work ceased. The clause included in
subsequent contracts was meant to protect the government against the
obligation to continue contract work even after dramatic changes in the
project ecosystem. Since then, the use of the clause has been such as to permit
the owner to terminate for practically any reason.
Today, the possibility of contract termination (entirely or in part) is treated in
most construction contracts. In most cases, the right to terminate a contract
between an owner and the prime contractor is reserved for the owner,
although it is possible that the contractor reserves the same privilege. In the
same way, subcontracts between the prime contractor and a subcontractor
often include clauses for cancellation.
For the owner, the right to termination is justified in contracts for two reasons:
Termination for default of the contractor and termination for the convenience
of the owner. The former case is applicable in cases the contractor materially
fails to meet its contractual obligations (is in default). The latter case refers to
the owner's privilege to cancel a contract with a contractor without necessarily
disclosing any reason.
Contract Termination is legally treated and enforced as a last controlling
technique; indeed, it is rare. Because in both cases the owner reserves the
right to proceed to an action with great repercussions for the contractor, the
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laws (and courts) require that this right is used with prudence and in good
intent. The privilege itself is almost never questioned in contracts or in court,
however, the provisions regarding final payment, ongoing commitments by the
contractor and compensation differ greatly among contracts and court rulings.
The legislation for each of the two cases, being substantially different in both
legal and practical terms, is treated in the sections to follow. Relevant issues
and contractual provisions are mentioned next, and the chapter closes with
citations and samples of termination-related clauses.
3.2 CURRENT CONTRACT LITERATURE
Since the initial introduction of the clause in military government contracts,
the termination clause began being used for all government projects, and
subsequently spread to the private sector as well. Today, standardized
contracts used in both public and private construction include termination
clauses, but specific provisions differ.
Because of their popularity or extend of usage in the US, the following
discussion will focus on two standard contracts: The Federal Government
Construction Contract, and the American Institute of Architects (AlA) Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
This form of contract is used by all federal government construction contracts.
The US army corps of engineers, the US Navy Facilities Engineering Command,
the US Bureau of Public Roads and other organizations employ this format for
construction projects. Special provisions differ among each agency's contracts,
but only slightly. Part 49 of the Federal Acquisitions Regulation[29' provides the
policies and procedures relating to the complete or partial termination of
federal contracts for the convenience of the government or for default.
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AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS (AlA) STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
OWNER AND CONTRACTOR
The AIA contract is very widely used for fixed-price building construction in the
private sector in the US. Although it provides the right to terminate to both the
owner and the contractor, the AIA documents implicitly discourage termination
through various provisions.
These standard documents have been updated over time, to include provisions
relevant to most situations that arise in construction situations. Generally, they
provide for termination by mutual agreement, and they enforce contractual
power to terminate. These situations are discussed further.
3.2.1 TERMINATION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
In the same manner that the owner and contractor engage into an agreement,
they have the power to mutually cancel it. Legally and formally, the
termination of a contract in consent is similar to a new contract.
However, issues arise. In practice, when one party initiates discussion for the
termination of a contract and the other party does not expressly accept,
whether termination occurred by mutual agreement, and whether
compensation is due has to be determined from the actions of the two parties
after the proposition to cancel. These cases are usually settled in court. Other
issues involve unbalanced benefits from the contract at the point of mutual
cancellation. If the contractor is paid for work it has not performed at the time
of cancellation, the termination decision might not be enforced.
In any case, when a contract is cancelled by mutual agreement, it is obvious
that both parties have established their best interest in doing so. Thus, the
situation does not pose a question of evaluation other than that of individually
assessing the circumstances that lead both parties to agree.
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3.2.2TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
The owner may (partially or fully) terminate a contract when the contractor's
performance substantially deviates from the contractual agreement, thus
constituting a breach. The owner may subsequently continue the terminated
work on their own responsibility, re-bid the terminated portion of the contract,
or cancel it altogether. Some standard contracts allow for partial termination
while others do not specifically state so.
Partial termination can be to the benefit of the contractor: The owner may not
fully terminate a partially complete, logically and technically divisible project
without risking being accused of bad faith in doing so. The owner is thus
inclined to opt for partial termination and therefore compensation of the
contractor for the work performed already (depending on the quality).
This rationale brings out two major issues in termination for default. First, the
owner must be judged to be acting in good faith, in other words, the reasons
causing the owner to take this course of action must be material an important.
This means that the owner can clearly see no alternative to terminating the
contract. Minor variances from the contractual schedule, budget or quality do
not usually provide grounds for termination. Otherwise, termination can be
considered to be intentional and wrongful thus allowing for punitive damages
for the contractor. On the other hand, courts are reluctant to impose punitive
damages on the basis of wrongful termination, because that can create legal
precedence on which terminations in the future can be easily disputed.
The second issue is the undisputed responsibility of the contractor. In using
their right to terminate a contract, the owner must be sure that the reasons for
default arise only from responsibilities of the contractor, and cannot be rooted
back to actions of the owner. Otherwise, the termination is very likely to be
challenged by the contractor and if it is found unsubstantiated, the penalties
for the owner can be severe. Obviously, in a real construction situation,
proving this for a fact is very hard. Consequently, the owner who invokes
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termination for default takes the risk of the contractor being able to prove that
the default can be justified by actions of the owner.
The issues mentioned above provide two important risk factors the owner must
consider when using the termination right. The probability of a termination
action ultimately achieving its lawful intended purpose, i.e., the proper
delivery of the project, must enter the decision rules and models of the owner
and direct their actions.
3.2.3TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF THE OWNER
By the relevant clause, now common to both public and private contracts, the
owner reserves the right to unilaterally terminate a contract for their
convenience. Federal procurement law has also developed the idea of
constructive convenience termination, by which a wrongful default termination
can be converted into a convenience termination.
Invoking the clause requires the contractor to stop all work, place no further
purchase orders, cancel orders already made, and perform all other acts
designed to terminate performance and protect the interests of the owner. The
contractor is reimbursed for work performed unavoidable losses suffered, and
expenses intended to protect the owner's interest. Also, the contractor is paid
the agreed profit for the work performed.
Inasmuch as the convenience termination clause gives apparent unlimited
power to the owner, it is not without restrictions. An important one derives by
a court order of 19821, by which the US government was not allowed to
terminate the contractor and use a cheaper one to finish the work, since the
US government knew of the existence of the cheaper contractor at the time of
the bid. The bottom line is that convenience termination is allowed if the
project ecosystem has significantly changed. While rather vague, in real terms
1 681 F.2d 756 (Ct.C1.1982) TorncelLo v. United States
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this condition reduces the usefulness of convenience termination significantly.
A convenience termination that does not follow a significant change in the
project ecosystem may be deemed as abuse of discretion in court, resulting in
large compensation for the contractor.
The AIA contract provides that the owner can suspend without cause, but is not
specific about termination. In this case, it provides for increases in the cost of
performance, including profit on the increased cost of performance caused by
any suspension, delay or interruption by the owner.
3.2.4TERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTOR
In general, contract draft prepared by the owner will not contain termination
privileges for the contractor. On the other hand, drafts prepared by
professional associations will. Indeed, the Federal Government Construction
Contract does not provide such clauses.
The AIA contract allows the contractor to terminate a contract for default,
even though under very specific circumstances. A 30-day stoppage of work
caused by specific events, give the contactor right to terminate AIA contracts
made before 1987. Another clause was added then, permitting the contractor
to cancel a contract if the has been a 60-day work stoppage caused by the
owner's failure to perform "matters important to the progress of work." Still,
termination is not effective until 7 days of written notice have passed.
In addition, the AIA document permits the contractor to terminate for
convenience if there are repeated suspensions, delays, or interruptions of work
that aggregate to more than 100% of the total number of days scheduled for
completion, or 120 days in any 365-day period, whichever is less. The same
privilege is granted if a relevant court order is enforced, or if a government act
or other emergency makes material and resources unavailable. These
conditions, as described in paragraph 14.1.1 of the AIA contract, qualify by
nature for convenience termination by the contractor.
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3.3 FINANCIAL RESTITUTION
At the time of termination, the two contracted parties will surely have
conferred benefits to one another. The owner will have made progress
payments to the contractor, and vice-versa, the contractor will have
completed and perhaps handed over part of the work. Under termination,
these benefits are sometimes subject to restitution, or recovery, for both
parties.
If termination has been made for the convenience of the owner, the contract
will provide a formula for the calculation of these benefits. In termination for
default of the contractor, it is usually the owner what will have claims against
the contractor, which will exceed the value of unpaid work performed by the
contractor. The owner is then entitled to these benefits. If the benefits
claimed by the owner do not exceed payments for work performed already, the
contractor, although in default, is usually entitled to them.
Generally, courts hold that work performed is subject to payment, and this
rationale governs relevant settlements. On the other hand, the conditions and
potential outcomes of termination put these amounts under risk, and their
calculation is not certain. This risk is what drives the decision-making process
for termination, both for default and for convenience.
3.4 OTHER RELATED CLAUSES
A set of standard contract clauses is relevant to termination and the
procedures followed thereafter. Also, they are related to schedule and cost
issues arising from contract termination, and to special conditions that affect
the feasibility and attractiveness of the option to terminate. These contractual
clauses and provisions will prove critical in assessing and evaluating the
decision to terminate, as they are vital in determining the risk and value of
termination at any given instance, either for convenience of for default.
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The law governing contracts is provides for conditions for termination. These
clauses are valid even if they are not mentioned specifically in a contract, and
even in case they are, courts may enforce the law rather than contractual
clauses. In order to provide as sound a basis for agreement as possible
however, construction contracts refer to termination in several different
clauses. The most important of them are: material or future breach of the
contract, bankruptcy, surety bonds, liquidated damages, bidding and bid
rejection. These issues are discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1MATERIAL BREACH OF THE CONTRACT
Considering the complexity of both a construction situation and the contracts
and laws that govern it, it is almost impossible for all parties to act in
agreement with the contract at all times during a project. Most often, one or
both parties in a contract will breach it in some way. At the lack of the notion
of material breach, any breach of a contract would formally enable the non-
breaching party to invoke termination clauses.
Material breach is the term used in contracts to refer to situations where the
invocation of termination clauses (or other drastic measures) is permissible.
Nevertheless, it is very hard to define exactly what a material breach of a
clause is. Courts usually determine the materiality of breach by focusing on the
following factors:
1. The importance of the deviation from the contractual basis, within reason,
and the likelihood of future non-conformance.
2. The feasibility of compensation of the owner for the contractor's non-
conformance. This depends on whether the subject of the breach is easily
correctable, and on whether the actual damage caused is easily
measurable.
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3. The non-recoverable losses suffered by the contractor if the contract is
indeed terminated. This depends on the financial status of the contractor,
the volume of unused material ordered or delivered etc.
4. The true reasons for non-conformance. This is the most difficult point to
prove in a courtroom. Arguments would include cross-accusations between
the parties, Force Majeure, and previous breaches of the contract (material
or not). The true reasons for non-conformance, as well as the
circumstances under which they become known during construction can
play a major role in determining the materiality of a breach.
5. The contract itself. The language used in a contract for various matters is
usually a good indication of whether these matters are perceived as
important or not. A breach of such clauses may constitute a material
breach of the contract.
6. The immediate reaction of the non-breaching party to the breach. If the
reaction is a formal and prompt written notice of protest, then the breach
is likely to be perceived as material. On the other hand, if there is no
reaction at all, the non-breaching party may be considered to have waived
its relevant rights. In a relevant court ruling2, the court held that "Where a
contract is ambiguous, the court will accord considerable weight to the
construction the parties themselves give to it, evidenced by subsequent
statements, acts and conduct."
The importance of justifying the existence of a material breach is paramount
for termination. Otherwise, as mentioned above, termination can be judged to
be wrongful, with serious financial consequences for the terminating party. As
the matter of fact, improper termination constitutes a material breach.
2 RAD-Razorback Limited Partnership v. B.G. Coney Co., 713 S.W.2d 462 (Ark.1986)
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Improper termination can be viewed as interference with contractual
performance, specifically, it can be interpreted as complete prevention of the
contractor from performing. In addition to the losses suffered related to the
wrongfully terminated contract, the contractor will usually claim losses from
damage to its reputation, loss of bonding capacity and if applicable,
bankruptcy. The monetary damages involved are usually very high.
From the above, it is evident that termination is likely to kick back to the
terminating party, if the breach on which it is based cannot be proven to be
material. Real situations are much more complicated than described here, as
they usually involve numerous breaches of the contract by both parties, some
of which can be judged as material, and some others are the consequences of
previous breaches or ways of conduct. Determination in those situations is
sought in a court of law, with uncertain outcomes for both parties. Effectively,
the risk in using the termination clause lightly is too great, and the implications
are too important. Establishing termination grounds on a material breach
should be one of the leading risk factors for termination decision support.
3.4.2FUTURE (ANTICIPATORY) BREACH OF THE CONTRACT
In contrast to the previous section, which deals with breaches that have
already occurred, this section discusses breaches that may happen in the future
(anticipatory). These may result from two situations:
1. A substantiated expectation that one party will not conform to the contract
in the future. Such situations may appear to constitute a breach of the
contract: The parties must, at all times, at least appear capable of
delivering their part of the contract. Providing assurance of capability to
perform is in the essence of a contract.
2. A threat that one party will not conform to the contract in the future. A
protest for breach can be filed based on such a threat, if there exist
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concrete evidence that the threatening party is determined to carry out the
threat.
Anticipatory breach is likely to occur in private construction, in the event that
the owner appears to become unable to make payments because of its financial
status. In this case, the contractor may claim an anticipatory breach of the
contract. Reciprocally, the contractor may prospectively breach the contract if
it experiences a massive turnover or firing of employees, unavailability of
subcontractors, if it cancels purchase orders, or if it fails to provide assurance
for any of the above.
Obviously, anticipatory breach of the contract is even more vague and hard to
prove than material breach, especially in the presence of surety bonds and
liquidated damages clauses, discussed in following sections. Future breach is all
about probabilities. The question is whether the owner (contractor) should wait
for more information about the contractor's (owner's) ability or intention to
conform, at the additional expenses involved, or whether it should terminate
the contract instantly on the basis of a future breach. To complicate matters
even more, the law provides that one party may not recover damages caused
by another party's breach, when those damages could have been avoided by
taking reasonable steps to cut down or eliminate the loss. These questions
should also enter the decision models for termination as in the previous
paragraph (material breach). Furthermore, it is evident that the laws
concerning anticipatory breach impose the factor of timing a termination.
These issues will be addressed qualitatively and quantitatively in Chapter 5.
3.4. 3 BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy can be associated with termination in two ways, depending on
which party wishes to terminate the contract, the bankrupt or the financially
healthy one. Construction contracts used to allow automatic cancellation of
contracts if a party filed for bankruptcy. The owner was usually given the
power to terminate if the contractor filed for bankruptcy or had serious
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financial problems (see also Section 3.4.2). Contradicting this, the US Congress
overrode this law (and any deriving contract clauses), by updating bankruptcy
law to provide that the bankrupt party is given the choice of continuing or
rejecting performance. In the presence of surety bonds (see Section 3.4.4), the
surety is not released of its obligations when the contractor bankrupts, rather,
it must make the relevant guarantees good and seek recovery of the penal sum
from the bankrupt contractor (with little hope of succeeding).
Although the probability of termination due to bankruptcy of either party is
large, it does not pose an interesting decision making problem. In either case
of bankruptcy, the economic issues are taken over by surety and financial
institutions. The relevant decisions for both the project and the involved
parties are fairly easy and will not concern us further.
3.4.4SURETY BONDS
Surety bonds are essentially hired guarantees of performance, bidding and
labor and material coverage, on behalf of the contractor. They are different
from insurance contracts in that the obligations are not limited to those
deriving from natural phenomena, but include the bonded parties'
responsibilities.
In standard practice, the contractor (the Principal) pays a fee3 (a premium) to
a large, stable and reliable financial institution (the Surety), in exchange for a
promise (guarantee) that the surety makes to the owner (the Obligee) that the
contractor will perform according to the contract. The guarantee is bounded
below a monetary limit that the surety is responsible for, the Penal Sum. The
amount of the penal sum is stated in various ways, depending on the type of
bond it corresponds to. In case the surety is called to back up the guarantee,
3 The price of the bond is in the neighbourhood of 0.5% of the value of the contract. In
case the bond is issued after the price of the contract is agreed on, then the owner
pays the fee.
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the principal and all other indemnitors are liable to compensate the surety for
these costs. However, these costs can be so large that cannot be recovered by
the surety. This is the reason why the surety, taking the risk of guaranteeing,
does not rely on the principal's financial strength but on its competence and
Likelihood of completing the contract.
The existence of a surety bond means the existence of another two contracts,
further than the one between the contractor and the owner: One contract
exists between the surety and the owner, and another between the surety and
the contractor. This structure of contractual obligations is shown in Figure
3.4-1.
SURETY
PRINCIPAL OBLIGEE
FIGURE 3.4-1: THE TRIANGULAR CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE OF SURETY BONDS
There are three types of bonds required in construction contracts: The Bid
bond, the Performance Bond, and the Payment Bond.
BID BONDS
The guarantee of bid bonds is summarized in the following points:
o The surety guarantees to the Obligee that the principal will enter into
contract, if it wins the bid.
o The surety guarantees to the Obligee that the principal will furnish the
performance bond and other insurance policies required in the contract.
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The penal sum for the bid bond is meant to recover the Obligee's real damages
for the principal's failure to conform to the conditions above. In agreement to
this, the penal sum is determined either from liquidated damages clauses
contained in the bid (usually as a fixed amount or percentage of the contract
value), or from determination of the real damages suffered by the Obligee.
PAYMENT BONDS
The guarantee in a payment bond is the surety's promise that it will pay
subcontractors and suppliers if the prime contractor fails or refuses to do so.
The existence of the guarantee requires that the subcontractors and suppliers
(claimants) have a contract with the principal (the prime contractor).
However, this condition alone is not sufficient. The claimant must prove that
the material provided were "used or reasonably required in the performance of
the construction contract." This phrase focuses attention to hardcopy material
used on site, and excludes some important sources of cost for the
subcontractor, such as overhead costs, as well as estimation and preparation
costs. Further discussion of payment bonds and their necessity requires the
distinction between public and private construction.
In the private sector, an unpaid subcontractor or supplier may file liens (legal
claims) against the property of the owner under the Mechanic's Liens laws.
Naturally, owners wish to avoid this event, and usually require that the
contractor furnish a payment bond. In the public sector, the federal
government and states are indemnified from such liens. That is, a claimant may
not claim federal or state property under the mechanic's liens law. There are
other routes a claimant may seek compensation in a public project, e.g., by
presenting claims against public bodies and request special legislation in
Congress, state legislatures or city councils, but both the government and the
states wish to avoid such costly and time consuming procedures. The Miller Act,
applicable to federal contracts, and Little Miller Acts, applicable to state
contracts, provided the legal solution to this problem.
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In the United States, the law requiring contract surety payment bonds on
federal construction projects is known as the Miller Act (1935, 40 U.S.C.
Section 270a to 270f). The Miller Act requires the general contractor on a
federal project to post two bonds: a performance bond and a labor and
material payment bond.
The Miller Act states that, for contracts exceeding $100,000 in amount for the
construction, alteration, or repair of any public work in the U.S., the general
contractor to whom the job is awarded must be able to supply the owner with:
1. A performance bond in an amount that the contracting officer regards as
adequate for the protection of the United States. The bond amount is
normally 100 percent of the contract price.
2. A separate payment bond for the protection of suppliers of labor and
materials. The amount of the payment bond shall be equal to the total
amount payable by the terms of the contract unless the contracting officer
awarding the contract makes a written determination supported by specific
findings that a payment bond in that amount is impractical, in which case
the amount of the payment bond shall be set by the contracting officer. In
no case shall the amount of the payment bond be less than the amount of
the performance bond.
Formerly under the Miller Act, payment bonds did not have to be greater than
2.5 million dollars, regardless of the value of the general contract. The sum of
the payment bond was 50% of the contract price when the contract was less
than $1-million and 40% when the contract was from $1-million to $5-million.
The 1999 Act requires that the bond be equal to the performance bond
amount, usually the total amount due under the contract, affording more
protection to subcontractors and suppliers.
The Miller Act payment bond covers subcontractors and suppliers of material
who have direct contracts with the prime contractor (i.e., first-tier claimants).
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Subcontractors and material suppliers who have contracts with a
subcontractor, but not those who have contracts with a supplier, are also
covered and are called second-tier claimants. Anyone further down the
contract chain is considered too remote and cannot assert a claim against a
Miller Act payment bond posted by the contractor. The Construction Industry
Payment Protection Act of 1999 also prohibits prime contractors from requiring
subcontractors to waive their payment bond rights in the subcontract
documents.
Many states in the U.S. have adapted the Miller Act for use at the state level.
These state statutes are known as Little Miller Acts. State courts interpreting
their own laws will often look to federal case law for guidance. This discussion
of the Miller Act is a good starting point for all other payment bonds. However,
state bond laws vary from the federal laws, and state courts are not bound by
federal court rulings. Laws vary from state to state and wise contractors
understand the bond laws prior to working in other states.
Early termination of a contract between the owner and the contractor is mostly
related to performance and bid bonds. They formally assure financial
compensation in case of contract breach and in most contracts, the procedures
as well as methods for calculating the rightful compensation will be provided.
PERFORMANCE BONDS
The guarantee of a performance bond is the surety's promise to fulfill the
principal's obligations towards the contract between the principal and the
obligee, in the case the principal breaches this contract. The guarantee cannot
be called against in the event of a principal's failure to perform that is caused
by the obligee's actions or conduct or by an act of God (force Majeure). This is
a central issue of question in disputes and calls against performance bonds:
Before the surety is obliged to make compensate the obligee, it must be firmly
established that the responsibility for non-performance belongs entirely to the
principal.
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This is one of the reasons a performance bond does not completely hedge the
owner for non-performance of the contractor. In real situations, it is hard to
prove that the responsibility lies solely with the contractor, and the surety will
not act in benefit of the owner unless it is established beyond doubt that the
contractor is in default. The wording of the bond also contributes to this, by
often being vague as to the aspects of the contractor's performance that are
backed by the bond. AIA document A311 states "...if the contractor shall
promptly and faithfully perform said contract then this obligation shall be null
and void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect."
But performance bonds provide only partial hedging for other reasons as well.
If the contractor is financially strong, the surety is even less likely to respond
to the owner's concerns immediately, since it knows that whatever extra
claims generated by waiting more, will be ultimately covered by the
contractor. Furthermore, if the surety acts and pays for the guarantee, and the
claim is later found to be unsubstantiated, the surety may be unable to recover
the amount paid. These factors that undermine the hedging provided to the
owner by performance bonds are counterbalanced by another, very important
element: Bonding capacity of the contractor, i.e., the amount for which
sureties will be willing to guarantee a particular contractor for. For every claim
between the owner and the contractor that reaches the surety and requires its
intervention, the bonding capacity of the contractor is severed. Since
performance bonds are required by almost all contracts (public and private)
today, such an event can practically result in the contractor going out of
business.
The penal sum for performance bonds is usually 100% of the contract value,
and this amount constitutes an upper limit for the surety's liabilities. In the
case of contract breach, the exact amount of the penal sum is calculated as
the cost of the terminated portion of the contract less any unpaid contract
balance, plus any liquidated damages incurred already.
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Even in the presence of all three types4 of bonds discussed, construction
contracts cannot account for all the complexity involved in a construction case,
and the responsibility of settling such situations is transferred to courts. Other
contract clauses, such as liquidated damages discussed in the next section, also
attempt to provide hedging to the owner in the case of breach of the contract.
As will be seen, however, they can provide only partial hedging and in the case
of contract termination, they could also possibly backfire against the
terminating party.
3.4.5LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A "liquidated damages" clause is almost always present in a modern
construction contract. Generally, the clause provides that the owner is to be
compensated for unexcused delays in the completion of work. In the absence of
a liquidated damages clause, the owner needs to prove (usually in court) the
real damages suffered because of the contractor's performance.
This brings the discussion to the true rationale behind liquidated damages
clauses. When the true damages suffered by the owner because of delays are
difficult to assess (and most of the time, they will be difficult to assess), the
owner and the contractor agree in advance on a reasonable estimation of those
damages. This estimation is the liquidated damages due by the contractor to
the owner for delays or other non-conformance to contractual obligations.
They are usually focused on delays, and consequently are expressed in a dollar
amount per day of delay.
Naturally, liquidated damages apply to those delays that are solely caused by
the contractor. In a real construction situation however, delays can be seldom
4 There are other, less common bonds also used in the construction industry: Work
Guarantee Bonds, which are used to back up the owner's claim under a warranty
given by the contractor and Lien Discharge Bonds, which guarantees that the surety
will pay the obligee in case a lien is placed on the property.
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traced back to a single cause. Usually, actions of either the contractor or the
owner initiate further actions of the other party and more reactions, until
matters escalate in substantial delays and breaches of the contract. In a
snowball like such, it is very hard to identify the true reasons for delays and
prove a unique applicability of the liquidated damages clause.
Liquidated damages are not a penalty or a threat to the contractor. They are
only an estimation of the actual damages suffered. On the other hand, if a
contract that contains liquidated damages clauses is delayed at no actual cost
to the owner, the clause still applies and compensation is due. The owner does
not need to prove actual damages in the presence of the clause. Inversely, if
the actual damages are less than what the contract provides, the owner cannot
claim them. Therefore, the liquidated damages clause is a binding agreement
between the contractor and the owner.
The fact that the rationale of the clause is to assess and agree on a reasonable
estimate enables courts to chose to enforce it at will. The factors that usually
come into play are:
1. The intention of the owner in introducing the clause. If it can be revealed
that the interpretation or usage of the clause was in the kind of a penalty
or threat, then courts may easily not enforce it.
2. The degree to which the amount claimed is reasonable. Since the liquidated
damages amount is an estimate of the actual damages, it must be proven
that it was a reasonable estimate at the time it was made. Again, the
reasonableness of the assessment may have nothing to do with the actual
damages suffered, but must hold at the time the contract was signed.
Because of these two assumptions, in the case of contract termination for
default, the clause may initiate very controversial outcomes. Liquidated
damages can be judged to provide enough compensation to the owner in the
case of poor performance. In that case, the court may judge a termination for
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default to be arising from bad intention rather than a measure to protect the
owner's interests: The owner's interests can be assumed to be protected by
the liquidated damages clause. In this case, termination may be wrongful, with
all the adverse consequences such a ruling can have for the owner.
3.4. 6 BIDDING
In principle, competitive bidding and the related procedures and rules are not
relevant with contract termination. The main reason is that, during the bidding
process, there exists no contract between the owner and (any) contractor.
Contracts are established at the time of the award 5. However, practical issues
early in the bid process and court rulings that account for them may sometimes
be relevant to contract termination. Moreover, issues that trigger breach and
termination sometimes find root in the initial bidding process.
In the first case, termination is referred to as bid withdrawal, usually because
of mistakes in the bid. Since the bid of any particular contractor is not
disclosed to others, there is not indication other than the owner's estimate, as
to whether a bid has a mistake or not. It is not uncommon that contractors win
a bid because of a mistake they have made in calculations or assumptions.
Usually, such mistakes are discovered at the bid hearing process or shortly
after award of the contract. What happens if a bidder wins a contract because
of a mistake?
The law used to be stringent on the matter. The contractor had no right to
withdraw or alter the bid, if the mistake was not arising in any way from the
owner. Circumstances have lead to the modification of the law in this matter.
Courts will now allow the withdrawal or modification of a bid containing a
5 For more information on the formal and legal aspects of contracting, see [22] and
[26].
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mistake, if certain conditions are met6. Perhaps the most important is that the
mistake must be proven. The bidder alone is responsible for providing proof
that the submitted bid contains an unintentional mistake and that a "mistake"
was not "planted" in the documents for future use. The other relevant
conditions are the following:
1. The bidder has made a material mistake in constructing its bid. That is, the
mistake must make a significant difference in the final price(s) submitted.
2. The claimed mistake must be subject to objective determination, i.e., the
nature and magnitude of the mistake must be demonstrable just by
examination of the bid documents or any bid preparation documents.
3. The bid mistake must be clerical and not judgmental. Clerical mistakes
include mistakes in calculations, oversights, misplaced decimal (e.g., copy
$20,000 instead of $200,000) etc. Judgmental mistakes refer to
misinterpretations of the specification documents, erroneous assessments
and forecasting and assumptions.
4. The owner will unconscionably profit from the mistake, if the contractor is
not allowed to withdraw the bid.
5. The owner's loss because of bid withdrawal is limited to loss of bargaining
power, and nothing else. What else could the owner lose? If the claim for
the mistake is made late, other than bargaining power the owner loses also
time and money from the delay.
6. The bidder's mistake must not be the result of gross or culpable negligence
i.e., the mistake must not result from excessive carelessness or failure to
6 The list is general, and seeks to convey the rationale of the decision rather than a full
account of conditions.
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obtain and understand all the documents, regulations, site conditions,
specifications and plans relevant to the project.
Once a mistake has been proven, there are many different possible courses of
action:
o The bid can be withdrawn (or, if a contract has been signed, the contract
may be rescinded). In most cases, if the bidder is allowed to withdraw its
bid, it is not liable for any compensation to the owner.
o The bid can be withdrawn if the parties have not entered into contract.
This alternative is very similar to the previous one, with one difference: It
is argued that since a contract has not been made, the withdrawing bidder
is only in breach of its promise to enter a contract in case of an award.
Then, the contractor is only liable for the amount of the bid bond, if one
exists. Strangely enough, courts often overlook this alternative.
o The bid may be modified (again, if the contract has bee signed, the
contract may be reformed).
o The bidder may waive its right to withdraw or reform the bid, usually by
keeping silent about the mistake.
An important detail, relevant to termination, governs the third alternative. The
contract may be reformed to reach a corrected value, only if this corrected
value is lower than the second lowest bidder. If correction of the mistake
results in a contract price higher than that, the only alternative to the bidder is
to withdraw the bid. If the owner and the contractor have entered into
contract, the only alternative is the termination of the contract.
Whether termination in this case is rightful or not depends on the
circumstances under which the mistake was discovered and how it was
characterized. In any case, termination of a contract in such situations may be
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risky for the owner. Depending on the timing the mistake was discovered the
other bids may not be valid, and the owner will always lose bargaining power
as well as time and money for re-opening the bid. Finally, the mistaken
contractor may suit against the owner for wrongful termination, which will
prove costly for the owner in the end.
To avoid mistaken bids, the law provides that the owner has the duty to verify
a bid in case of a suspected mistake. Furthermore, the owner is obliged to
suspect a mistake and request verification from the bidder, if the questionable
bid is substantially lower than the other bids or the owner's estimate. Finally,
if the owner suspects a specific mistake, it has the duty to direct the bidder's
attention to it and request confirmation of the bidder's intent related to the
area in question. Although this owner's duty reduces the probability of a
mistake being discovered after award of the contract, it also relieves the
contractor of some of its responsibility on the correctness of the bid.
The bidding system and relevant Legislation provides an equally vague and risky
legal terrain for the case of termination, as the other frequent clauses
mentioned here. These practices should govern the decision-making procedures
and models for contract termination. Also, the legal ambiguity and complexity
inherent in cases of termination should mean that legal advice is necessary for
both parties involved, and before any decisions are made. Nevertheless, the
decision to terminate requires managerial and engineering, other than legal
expertise.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The source of all evil, when evil is contract cancellation, is the misalignment of
the involved parties' interests. Construction projects involve several entities
depending on the delivery system followed, each with their own primary
objectives and expectations from the project (Table 4.1-1).
TABLE 4.1-I: OWNER - CONTRACTOR OBJECTIVE ALIGNMENT (FROM [19])
SAchieve profit and other financial gains
.Satisfy client and generate repeated business
.Manage cash flow
.Limit Long term tiabitity
.Develop employees and create internal satisfaction
.Complete the project within budget
. Complete the project within schedule
. Maintain a high level of quality
. Execute the project safely, without wasted time or accidents
*Minimize claims and Litigation
*Meet return on investment goal
. Minimize plant operating and maintenance costs
. Achieve high product quality
. Achieve high product throughput capacity goals
. Provide design flexibility to meet future demands
. Minimize disruptions to existing operations
. Avoid negative impact on environment and community
. Reduce project cycle time
. Exceed internal customer's expectations
Observe that, although some goals are shared between the contractor and the
owner (e.g., to minimize claims and litigation & to complete the project within
schedule and budget), overall, their goals are quite different and in some
cases, incompatible. These different goals may generate conflict, which may
even lead to litigation, depending on the delivery system and the contract type
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used. Table 4.1-Il summarizes the types of relationships for four common
delivery methods: Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Pure Construction Management
(PCM), Construction Management at Risk (CMR), Design-Build (D/B).
TABLE 4.1-11: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PARTICIPANTS
SCu--ac Unofficial :E
--- Contract U On oftficial _r Unofficial CL
DBB
TABLE 4.1-111: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PARTICIPANTS
Oer- Contract
Contao Internal 1s
Contract Contract Unofficial
CMR
Table 4.1-11 and Table 4.1-Ill indicate which contractual relationships might be
breached. In a traditional design-bid-build system, the engineer usually holds a
fiduciary relationship with the owner. The misalignment of interests is
apparent between the contractor and the owner, and the potential for conflicts
and/or contract breach lies exactly there. Traditionally, it is the engineer's
responsibility to act as an intermediate party to these disagreements, without
binding either the contractor or the owner to the proposed solution (Figure
4.1-1, adopted from [19]). Following unsuccessful determination by the
engineer, the parties resolve conflicts through binding arbitration7. The
effectiveness of the engineer to resolve conflicts of interest and align
7 Arbitration is performed by various parties, depending on the contractual conflict
resolution clauses. The arbitrator may or may not be the engineer.
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objectives is nevertheless undermined with the size of the project, the dollar
amount involved in disputes, and the engineers' own tendency to become part
of the dispute (by developing fiduciary relationships, often with the owner).
The other delivery systems, CMR, D/B and PCM are not significantly better in
aligning the objectives of involved parties or providing the ground for their
resolution. Therefore, construction under these systems is equally prone to
allowing disputes to emerge as in the traditional DBB.
riations between the
lies anenmwted w resole
marner befre reaching
zrmtion. Arbitration
cedunms usually
pened after final
BINDIN ARBITRATION
DETERMINATION
BY DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL
FIGURE 4.1 -1: Two-STEP CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Disputes are the starting point of some cancellations which arise from the
alleged contractor's non-conformance to the contractual requirements. In
other cases, contracts are cancelled for the convenience of the owner. With
one exception , termination for default of the contractor and for convenience
arise from different circumstances. The former are associated with contractor-
specific reasons, while the latter are associated with the entire project's
standing in its ecosystem. It is convenient to study the two cases completely
8 See Section 3.2.3: Wrongful terminations for default may be "converted" to
terminations for the convenience for legal purposes. This is a legal complexity, which
can affect the actual evaluation for termination, see Chapter 6.
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separated, but they are not always so. The microscopic performance measures
determine the overall attractiveness of the project, and vice-versa, the
macroscopic project ecosystem diffuses into everyday contractor performance.
4.2 TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT: DRIVERS
As mentioned above, the drivers for default termination are related to costs
the owner will have to incur because of the contractor's performance. These
costs change over time, as the contractor's performance adheres to the
contract or not. Otherwise, there would be no contract in the first place.
These costs are associated with the project ecosystem (Figure 4.2-1): Quality
& performance, time & schedule, Cost a Budget, Sociopolitical context and
Natural environment. However, contractor-specific drivers for termination for
default are more often related to cost, quality and performance.
Changes in each of the factors of the project ecosystem can provide reasons for
contract cancellation. Furthermore, dynamic relations between the factors of
the ecosystem, such as the delay time in monitoring or reporting information,
scan also create conditions favorable to cancellation. Table 4.2- provides a list
of factors or states of the project ecosystem that could provide indication of
conditions that favor or oppose contract cancellation.
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QUALITY a
PERFORMANCE
COST a TIME a
RESOURCES SCHEDULE
NATURAL SOCIO-POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT
FIGURE 4.2-1: THE PROJECT ECOSYSTEM PROVIDES REASONS FOR CONTRACT CANCELLATION
The monitoring factors for default termination are essentially the same as the
factors the owner or CM should monitor in order to defend claims against them.
The differences lie in the significance and magnitude:
Most of the elements in Table 4.2-1, especially the ones that favor termination,
refer to material breaches of the contract. The factors that oppose it are more
related to the implications of termination on the project, the contractor and
the owner.
Table 4.2-1 also indicates that the owner should monitor elements of the
project that may appear in court. These elements, namely the degree of
completion of the project, the financial status of the contractor, the owner's
conduct during the project towards the contractor's contractual performance,
are important as they introduce high uncertainty for the owner. As analyzed in
Chapter 3, in a complicated project ecosystem, it is fairly common that
termination leads to litigation. In these cases, it is also common that the owner
does not yield the expected benefits from termination.
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TABLE 4.2-1: MONITORING FACTORS FOR DEFAULT TERMINATION
. Significant cost overruns due to the contractor's performance, which
the owner will bear based on the contractual agreement.
. Unbalanced bid (discovered after the award of the contract).
. Material mistakes in the bid, for which the owner can be made
responsible or accountable, or mistakes that render the contractor
not the lowest bidder.
. Mistakes in specifications and owner-issued documents.
. Any action of the contractor that increases the costs to the owner in
the future or increases the risk of potential such costs, regardless of
conformity to the contract.
. Percentage of subcontracted work.
. Internal financial status of the contractor, probability of bankruptcy.
" The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
mentioned above.
. The uncertain costs of litigation deriving from termination.
. The cost and availability of other contractors who may take over.
. Financial state of subcontracts under the main contract and
contractual obligations of the owner against them.
. Significant non-conformance to the schedule, with little hope of
conformance in the future, corresponding to large costs to the
owner.
. Critical delays for which the contractor, subcontractors, material
suppliers or labor unions are directly responsible.
. The owner's interference and responsibility for delays.
. Excusable/non-excusable, Compensable / non-Compensable delays
. Unforseeability of critical delays
. Percent of completed and paid work under the contract.
. Liquidated damages clauses in the contract.
. The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
mentioned above.
. The availability of other contractors who may take over the works.
. Schedule progress of subcontracts under the main contract and
contractual obligations of the owner against them.
. Significantly lower quality, with irreversible effects, affecting the
usefulness of the project.
. Unique technical expertise of the contractor.
. Internal financial status of the contractor, probability of bankruptcy.
. Contractor commitment and cooperation.
. Adversary Intent or Fraud: Once the courts have determined that a
contract exists, they are bound to find that the contract imposes
obligations of good faith, cooperation and fair dealing.
. The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
mentioned above.
. Contractor's non-conformance to contract clauses prescribing
environmental precautions
. Contractor actually or potentially inducing unrecoverable damages
to the surrounding environment.
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The factors that drive termination for default are often subject to large
uncertainties. These risks derive from insufficient understanding of the project
ecosystem, unbalanced sharing of information between the contractor and the
owner, uncertainty as to the evolution of the project in the future, and
uncertainty as to the costs and benefits of initiating termination. These sources
of uncertainties must be continuously accounted for, in a relevant decision
model in order to be assessed property. This is the subject of discussion in
Chapter 5.
Closing the subject of monitoring for default termination, it is useful to
mention that the monitoring effort should be coordinated in parallel with the
standard contractual dispute avoidance and resolution techniques. The more
staged this technique is, the better (Figure 4.2-2, adopted from [7]). As
explained in Chapter 5, default termination is associated with risks which
derive primarily from the outcome of the subsequent litigation. Figure 4.2-2
also explains that on higher "steps" of the ladder, flexibility and control over
the final outcome of a conflict, alternative mechanisms to resolve a dispute
and participation of the immediate project team are reduced, while the
relevant expenses and hostility between involved parties increase. If
termination is judged to be the only viable approach for default of the
contractor, it is probably also the last resort of the owner. Nevertheless, it
pays to try to coordinate the stages leading to termination with a dispute
resolution scheme.
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-' Increased expenses
LITIGATION and hostility.
BIND\NG T Less participation of the
team directly involved in the
NONBINDING project.
STANDING NEUTRAL T Less alternative mechanisms to
solve the dispute
NEGOTIATION Reduced flexibility and less control over
PREVENTION final outcome.
FIGURE 4.2-2: SIX-STEP DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION TECHNIQUE (DART)
4.3 TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF THE OWNER: DRIVERS
Termination for the convenience of the owner, in contradiction to termination
for default, requires a different monitoring scheme. Monitoring does not need
to be centered around the contractor's performance, but rather, around the
entire project ecosystem throughout the project's lifecycle.
Termination for convenience is very similar to premature cancellation of
research and development projects, analyzed in Chapter 2. The project is no
longer seen in the narrow perspective of construction, but in the broader sense
of a capital investment of long time horizon. In this sense, a contract or the
entire project is subject to termination for convenience when the current
assessment of costs and benefits from it has changed significantly since its
conception or initiation. Again, the costs and benefits need to be defined
broadly in relation to the entire project ecosystem. Their interpretation will
differ between capital projects: A private corporate owner expanding its office
facilities is likely to carry a different interpretation of costs and benefits than
the public sector undertaking a major transportation project. Whichever the
case, the organization needs to continuously monitor the factors that may
render a project (or a part of it) undesirable in the long run.
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The convenience termination clause, now always included in contracts, gives
the owner an almost unlimited power over the fate of the project and
consequently, the contractor(s). Moreover, as long as this power is not abused
in bad faith, it is almost never questioned. The reason why this is not
completely unfair for the contractor, is the significance of the factors that
oppose termination for convenience. In the case of capital projects, these
factors carry much more weight than for R&D projects and are subject to much
less uncertainty. The main reasons capital projects are not frequently
terminated are the following:
Capital investment is irreversible: Capital projects require dedicated
resources such as land and non-reusable building materials. Because of this,
commitment to capital projects is subject to very careful evaluation, planning
and feasibility analyses: Structures are there to stay. Very seldom is it possible
or financially plausible to "undo" a capital project.
The project ecosystem does not change dramatically: Often, the useful life
(or the payback period) of capitaL projects is of a different timescale than their
environmental impact. Therefore, unpredicted environmental effects usually
do not change the project ecosystem during construction. This is not to say
that environmental assessment studies are not relevant. Simply, the full
environmental effects of most capital investments are not seen during their
construction. The same is true of sociopolitical changes that projects may
cause. For example, a residential building downtown is likely to bring profits
regardless of minor changes in the social environment, and is unlikely to affect
or be affected significantly by changes in the environment during its payback
period.
Life-cycle flexibility and alternative uses: Some categories of capital projects
constitute sustainable investments in a variety of social, economic and
environmental contexts. The truth in this statement of course depends on the
nature of the structure discussed and its architectural flexibility. However, it is
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unlikely that the sustainability of a structure will be easily undermined by small
changes in its financial environment. A large spectrum of capital investments
can find alternative uses in case their original plan proves unviable during their
useful life.
In short, capital investments are subject to much less uncertainty than R&D
projects, both with respect to their development as to their useful life. On the
other hand, they are much more irreversible. Consequently, the planning and
evaluation processes before initiation, even being less elaborate, are much
more accurate than in R&D projects discussed earlier. As a result, termination
for convenience is not caused for quite the same reasons, nor is it as frequent
as in R&D projects.
Table 4.3-1 presents a monitoring scheme for convenience termination of
capital projects. The scheme attempts to cover most types of capital projects
and most owner organization configurations. For this purpose, it is useful to
broadly classify capital projects into one of the following categories:
1. General purpose, flexible, convertible private infrastructure (general
purpose warehouses and industrial buildings, residential buildings, mixed
office/ residential structures etc.)
2. Specialized inflexible private infrastructure (food warehouses, air
hangars, commercial/retail renovations or new construction, research
laboratories, educational buildings, hospitals, hotels, clean rooms and other
specialized industrial buildings, private roads)
3. Public Benefit large-scale infrastructure (electric power plants, waste
treatment plants, pipeline & information networks, nuclear power plants,
hydro-electric dams, transportation networks, airports etc.)
4. Public Benefit small-scale infrastructure (regional parks and public
spaces, government organizations, firehouses, public sports facilities etc.)
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These projects are different in various respects regarding termination. Apart
from their impact on the environment, they are also different in their
flexibility or change of use, commitment of capital, range & diversity of
stakeholders, immediate and long-term economic value and strategic
significance to the society. For each of these categories of infrastructure, some
or all of the termination factors in Table 4.3-1 apply.
TABLE 4.3-I: MONITORING FOR CONVENIENCE TERMINATION OF CONSTRUCTION (BASED ON [15])
Encouragement Of Persistence
Social/Economic Profile
Political Pressures/Support
Long-term sustainability of the owner organization
Ability to commit to a project to its completion
Diversity of stakeholders' utility perceptions (multiple stakeholders)
Susceptibility change in stakeholders' perception of utility
Organizational Inertia
2a. Static Project Factors
Organization's prior experience
Irreversibility of the capital investment / materials t Land re-use
Design Improvements or prior design mistakes t omissions
Mistaken feasibility study
Mistaken initial budget
Scope related to the initial requirements
Embedded flexibility of the end-result
Alternate uses of the structure
Alignment of costs & Benefit time horizon
High Sunk Costs
Intermittent Rewards
Salvage And Closing Costs
Benefits At End
2b. Project Manager Factors
Persistence
Reinforcement Susceptibility
Confronting Mistakes
Information Biasing
Job Security
Political Pressures
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3a. Lynamic Froject I-actors
Review Project Evaluation and Design Factors:
Design Improvements or prior design mistakes & omissions
Mistaken feasibility study
Mistaken initial budget
Scope related to the initial requirements
Political Pressures
Alignment of costs & Benefit time horizon
High Sunk Costs
Intermittent Rewards
Salvage And Closing Costs
Benefits At End
Performance & Technology:
Difficulty Achieving Technical Performance (regardless of contractor)
Time To Completion Lengthening (regardless of contractor)
Missing Performance Milestones (regardless of contractor)
Dramatic changes in available technology or requirements
Sponsorship:
Project Less Consistent With Organizational Goals
Loss of Importance To The Owner
Loss To Management Commitment To Project
Economics:
Lower Project ROI, ROS, Market Share Or Profit
Higher Cost To Complete Project
Less Capital Availability
Longer Time To Project Returns
Missing Project Cost Milestones
Reduced Match Of Project Financial Scope To The Organization
Sociopolitical & Natural Environment:
Better Alternatives Available
Increased Government Restrictions
End-Users/Stakeholders
Market Need Obviated
Market Factors Changed
Reduced Market Receptiveness
Decreased Number Of End Use Alternatives
Reduced Likelihood of Successful Commercialization
3b. Review Stakeholders' Characteristics
Evaluate Interactions And Progress Of Factors In Steps 1 and 2b
As mentioned above, not all of the monitoring factors in Table 4.3-1 apply for
all projects. For example, public infrastructure (categories 3 & 4 in the list
above) is more prone to changes in the stakeholders characteristics.
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Nevertheless, the owner's organization should account for these factors during
initial evaluation in order to assess the susceptibility of the project to
convenience termination. However, that is not enough. Depending on the
project's initial susceptibility, continuous monitoring for termination should
take place.
4.4 MONITORING FOR TERMINATION: PROJECT AUDITS
This monitoring effort is not meant to be made on its own. Most often, by the
time monitoring for termination is initiated, it will be too late: The result will
be pre-determined or, in any case, biased. Rather, monitoring for termination
should be embedded in the regular monitoring instruments followed by the
owner or the project manager during development. These instruments, namely
project audits, should be configured to track these termination factors if a
project is judged to be susceptible to termination from the beginning. To close
this chapter, a brief description of the logistics of audits as monitoring
instruments follows.
A project audit is the practical means of investigating in depth one particular
aspect of a project, or the entire project ecosystem. Their purpose is to
provide understanding for the project ecosystem, and insight into the
effectiveness of the project management policies and decisions. Their scope
often ranges from the strategic decisions and procedures on an aspect of the
project, to their tactical and operational implications. The audit procedures
are formal, and often clearly mandated by the party requesting an audit, so
that the process serves its intended purpose. In what follows, the concept, the
characteristics and benefits as well as guidelines for implementation of project
audits will be presented.
Project auditing is a powerful tool for tracking, learning about, and improving
project performance, however, it is costly both in terms of money and time.
Because of this, project audits are seldom conducted according to a regular
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schedule. In practice, they are often encountered as post-mortem evaluations
(i.e., after the project is over), or as investigations into elements of the
project that have caused it to go awry.
Organizations like British Petroleum (BP)E83 have developed a "Post-Project
Appraisal department (PPA)", responsible for evaluating selected projects after
their completion, if they are convinced that the audit can provide lessons to
the organization. A typical evaluation is very comprehensive: It looks into the
life cycle of the project from the initial proposal till two years after it is
operational. It is also very costly: The completion of a PPA for large
investments lasts about six months. Great effort has been put into
communicating the lessons learned from PPA to top and regional managers in
BP. The organization has benefited greatly from PPA's, making the department
an integral part of its planning and control processes.
Some circumstances make audits necessary during the development of
projects. This is often the case for large projects that run into trouble. Such a
comprehensive review can reveal reasons that caused trouble, which might not
be so obvious to any single team in the organization. Finally, the extra cost of
holding regular audits can sometimes be justified as a proactive measure, a
learning opportunity for "things done right", or as a means for monitoring
advances and changes in the organization. A regular auditing scheme can be
devised to monitor the implementation of the infrastructure (i.e.,
communication hardware and software) or organization for a global concurrent
design project. Regular audits can be suitable for monitoring the long-term
absorption of a new technology in standard organizational practices. Finally,
audits can be configured to provide opportunity of evaluating a project from a
perspective of early termination.
Project audits are evaluations of project performance, conducted through
investigation in a prescribed depth and scope, at pre-determined time intervals
in the lifecycle of the project, if circumstances call or at the end of it. The
KONSTANTINOS C. KALLIGEROS PAGE 65 OF 97
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT TERMINATION AS A CONTROL TECHNIQUE
product of an audit is a report, which includes the findings of the process and
relevant conclusions. Audits make a "cross-section" of a project in time and
look into the management, the methodologies, the procedures, the records,
the budget, the expenditures, the performance and the degree of the project
completion up to that point.
Audits are not merely a collection of data coming from the process of
monitoring the project. Their scope extends to "digging into" qualitative
information as well as abstract features of the project, such as the efficiency
of the management organization. They are not supposed to result in just a
report of quantitative facts about some aspects of the project, but to provide a
complete and comprehensive account of the project status and success, as well
as useful lessons for the future. Since "success" can only be defined with
respect to a goal, the auditing process must reflect that.
It is important that auditing is seen as a comparison rather than a mere
account of project activity. A reference base for this comparison has to be
established at the beginning of the project and used for every auditing purpose
during its implementation. To accurately and comprehensively measure
performance and thus obtain meaningful results, both the base of comparison
and the auditing procedure must be relevant, accurate, comprehensive and
truthful. The relevance of the auditing scheme with the specific project is
vital: Performance can be measured differently for different projects. In the
case of evaluation for convenience termination, the audit should be configured
to examine the project only with respect to the relevant factors in Table 4.3-I,
and not all of them.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
So far, Chapter 3 has dealt with the legal principles and contractual provisions
governing contract termination in two standardized and widely used forms of
construction contracts. Chapter 4 attempted to identify the drivers and
monitoring factors for both termination for convenience and for default. In the
former case, it is seen that the drivers are very similar to the ones governing
research and development projects (Chapter 2), although the nature of the
construction industry presents unique differences. In the latter case, the
drivers for termination are uniquely dependent upon the contractual
agreement and the traits of the industry. In both termination for convenience
and for default, a monitoring framework was established, for gauging relevant
and important factors.
Utilizing this framework requires that every time it is used, a decision for
termination is made. This chapter goes through the decision models used for
evaluating such decisions in other industries, their deficiencies and the ways
they can be inappropriate (or at least, not optimized) for the construction
industry. Alternative approaches to these methods are proposed, based on the
evaluation and decision models available in the literature.
5.2 RETROSPECTIVE DECISION MODELS FOR R&D PROJECTS
"Retrospective" decision models are widely used to evaluate the option for
termination of research and development projects. They involve fairly simple
analytical procedures, and the most advanced rely heavily on statistical
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information of similar past projects with regard to the matters of concern for
the current venture. Hence their name.
"Retrospective" decision models are based on measurements or estimates of
the current status of the project in relation to termination factors (such as
those in Table 2.3-1, page 23), and intuitive (most of the time) prediction of
the evolution of these factors in the future. A "score" of the project with
regard to each of those factors is assigned based on management's judgment,
intuition, experience and, in advanced frameworks, statistical evidence. Also,
the importance of each of these factors is taken into consideration, by
assigning a "weight coefficient" to each. The factors need not be expressed in
explicit units (monetary value or time) - an arbitrary scale suffices. They can
even take a Boolean form, such as "yes" or "no" answers.
Theoretically, these models fall under the "weighted sum" methodology of
evaluation of alternatives. The methodology relies on the existence of some
"absolute scale of evaluation," which has the potential of carrying all the
information about the value of each alternative. The alternative courses j, in
this case are two: The termination of a project (j - t) or its continuation (j -
c)9. Appropriate termination factors (e.g., in Table 2.3-1) can be regarded as
viewpoints, from which each alternative can be evaluated. Let there be n
factors (or criteria). Then the evaluation of each alternative for each of the
criteria, i, is
Score of alternative j on criterion i = g,(j)
The score for each criteria g, must of course be expressed in the same scale,
otherwise the comparison among criteria is impossible. This implies some sort
9 More alternatives can be added potentially, involving the continuation of the project
up to some point in the future and its termination then. These alternatives are not
considered here.
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of normalization of these scores. For instance, if the maximum imaginable
score on "profitability" is the expected profit of the project in dollars
3'i,max = $10,000 , and the current score of the project is g', = $6,400, then
_.= '1 i - 6,400 = 0.64. Further, defining the relative weight of each of
Y'i,max 10,000
the n criteria as kn, where the relative weight represents a trade-off10 , the
evaluation of each alternative for all the criteria will be
n
Value of Alternative j = V(j) = Zkg,(j)
i=1
Given V(j) for every j, the decision maker is in position to evaluate the optimal
alternative. Of course, the decision maker will first need to assess (1) the score
of each alternative with respect to each criterion, and (2) the weight of each
criterion in the final value. As mentioned above, these values are assigned
based on management's judgment, intuition, experience and, in advanced
frameworks, statistical evidence. The determination of these values for pre-
established sets of termination factors is the current direction of relevant
research, based on statistical evidence of past projects.
A similar approach consists of evaluating the "score" of continuing a project as
the only alternative, based on a predetermined set of criteria. The scores of
previous similar project that have either succeeded or failed are used to
determine a "cut-off" value. The score of the project under evaluation is then
compared to this "cut-off" value. If the score is below the cut-off score, then
the project is thought to be likely to fail.
10 The significance of the trade-off is expressed as follows: To compensate for a
disadvantage of k units on criterion i, you need an advantage of ki units on
criterion i.
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A statistical procedure, namely Discriminant Analysis[27 ,[21, can be utilized to
help derive fair weight factors and cut-off scores. Computationally, the
procedure is similar to multiple regression. A sample of projects for which a
decision has already been made is selected, and the scores are evaluated for
these projects. Using this data, the procedure determines appropriate weight
coefficients for each factor, so that the discriminant score of the project in
question is very likely to provide a correct estimate of its success or failure,
and therefore a decision on whether to terminate it or not. The method still
has weaknesses though. It assumes a universal discriminant function, otherwise
the projects cannot be comparable, but this is unrealistic when it comes to
certain success factors. However, even with this data, the evaluation of the
g, functions is left to the discretion of the decision maker.
5.2.1 EXAMPLE
For instance, assume the development of a new cosmetic hand-cream by a
small pharmaceuticals company. The product developed is based on synthetic
substances as opposed to the company's other products, which are 100%
natural. Management also found out recently that an international firm is
planning the release of a similar product in the same market. In the light of the
technical difficulties the R&D department is facing and the subsequent
schedule overruns, management is now wondering whether cancellation is
more appropriate than persistence. To support their decision, they have
developed a model (Figure 5.2-1), and they compare the success value of the
project to the values of other products developed in the company in the past.
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IftightedI
Success Weight Success
Criteria Value Factor Value
2 1 Probability of commercializing results 9 30% 2,70
2 Higher priority of other projects 2 12% 0,24
4 3 High return on investment 7 20% 1,401
5 4 Negative effects on other products 1 5% 005T
6 5 Change in support of project management 1 8% 0,08
6 Deviations in time schedules 1 10% 0,10 _
7 Strategic importance 10 15% 1 1,50
9 100% ,07
FIGURE 5.2-1: COMPUTATION OF THE SUCCESS VALUE OF A PROJECT (EXAMPLE IN Ms EXCEL)
The discriminant model they used weighs the termination criteria management
regarded as important, according to their perceived significance. The weight
factors they chose sum up to 100%, but that was not necessary. Alternatively,
they could have quantified the factors in relative terms, with a value greater
than 1 if the factor has "increased" since last reviewed or less than 1
otherwise. A "sum of the products" (SUMPRODUCT function in Excel) of these
values with the importance factors provides a weighted estimation of the
"tsuccess value" of the project - 6.07 in this case.
5.2.2RELIABILITY 8 APPLICABILITY ISSUES/CRITIQUE
Proper usage of the weighted sum decision model (and its discriminant variant)
relies heavily on some strict assumptions:
1. Evaluations on all scales are cardinal, meaning that they are numbers and
their values are used as such even if they result from normalizing ordinal
data.
2. Equal differences between values on scale i, whatever the location of the
corresponding intervals on the scale, should produce the same effect on the
overall evaluation V(j). In other words, each scale is assumed linear.
3. Weights represent trade-offs: Transforming the linearized scales results in
a related transformation of the scales.
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4. Criteria do not interact - additive independence applies.
Because of these assumptions and other reasons, the class of evaluation models
described above has inherent drawbacks, the most important of which are
summarized below.
1. Flexibility: In practical applications, projects are evaluated on different
criteria, because different circumstances are significant each time. The
discriminant models discussed above assume a single set of criteria
however. If the important set of factors for the project under evaluation is
a subset of the pre-determined factors of the model, then the redundant
elements will be eliminated through the statistical screening. If, on the
other hand, there exist factors that are not included in the discriminant
model, then comparison becomes unreliable.
2. Stability: The weighted sum model is very dependent on the initial set of
alternatives due to the normalization process. If g',max changes without any
change in the values of the weights, then the changed set of normalized
values for each alternative may cause a rank reversal between alternatives.
3. Arbitrary coding of non-quantitative data: The way non-quantitative data
is coded in values is straight-forward but arbitrary.
4. Linearization of Scales: An inherent drawback of the weighted sum method
is the assumption of a linear normalized scale. This is often not true: If the
earliest possible completion of a project (say, a hotel) is in April and the
latest possible is in June, then the benefit from accelerating the project
from June to May (before the summer season starts) is much larger than the
benefit from accelerating completion from May to April.
Unfortunately, these characteristics of the weighted sum-based models make
them worse than just one first approximation to the optimal decision
alternative; these models are, for the most part, unreliable and wrong. Two
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approaches have been followed to overcome the drawbacks of the weighted
sum method: (1) the construction of multi-attribute utility functions and (2)
the outranking family of approaches.
This text discusses the first approach as more appropriate for the evaluation of
construction contract cancellation.
5.3 EVALUATION FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION USING DECISION ANALYSIS
This section aims to build an evaluation methodology for construction contract
termination, either for convenience or for default. The methodology applied is
formally not new in the evaluation and decision analysis literature. Due to the
unique features of the construction industry, it is believed however that it is
more flexible and more suitable than evaluation and decision models used in
R&D projects.
The proposed methodology is formal decision analysis using multi-attribute
utility functions. Decision analysis lifts some of the drawbacks of the previously
mentioned models and provides more flexibility in the modeling and decision
process, which may be useful in a construction context. Furthermore, it is
associated with numerous other benefits which will be discussed in the closing
of this chapter.
The basic premises on which this methodology builds on are presented next.
They are essentially assumptions related to the preferences and behavior of
owners of capital projects. The methodology itself is explained next. The
chapter closes with a conclusion and critique of the proposed framework.
5.3.1 ASSUMPTIONS E MODEL PREMISES
As mentioned in Chapter 4, termination drivers arise from every element in the
project ecosystem: Cost, Schedule, Quality, Natural Environment &
Sociopolitical Context. Apart from termination drivers, these five elements also
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provide the measures for the attractiveness of a project or an individual
contractor. Before they are entered into a model, these elements must be
precisely defined:
o Cost = The total expenditures associated with a particular alternative.
These may include as appropriate: Direct construction costs, litigation
costs, opportunity costs, cost if capital and others. Costs are to be
minimized.
o Schedule = The time to complete the project, which is also to be
minimized.
o Quality = A measure of the quality of construction. Different measures for
quality apply to different works, and confining them at this point is not
appropriate (or useful, because of the wide variety of definitions for
quality, depending on the specific project). Quality, in any case, is to be
maximized.
o Natural Environment" = A measure of the direct effects of an alternative
on the natural environment. Depending on the project in hand, the goal
may be to maximize them or to minimize them. Usually, it will be the
latter.
o Sociopolitical Context = The beneficiary effects of the project on the
sociopolitical environment. Notice the role reversal from Chapter 4: The
sociopolitical context is not viewed as a factor affecting project
performance here, but rather, as an environment to be affected by it. For
public organizations usually, this factor can be an important decision
" For the natural environment and socio-political context, it is assumed that the owner
has a direct interest in these two elements, therefore, the value functions for these
attributes do not need to be determined from the collective decision-making
behavior of other entities.
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variable. In any case, it is important not to confuse the impact on the
sociopolitical context with the direct costs of the project, when evaluating
termination decisions.
These are the elements of value (or attributes of alternatives) for the owner,
which enter the decision model developed. In order to account for the
different units these attributes may be expressed in, and for the non-linearity
in the preferences of the decision-maker (i.e., the owner, see also Section
5.2.2), the level of each attribute has to be converted into a utility.
The means of deriving to the utility functions of the decision maker are beyond
the scope of this text. Nevertheless, it is accepted that these functions wilL be
non-linear, and more often, show risk-aversion. Double-convexity utility
functions are also acceptable within this framework, and common in
construction. For example, Figure 5.3-1 shows a possible utility function for the
completion time of a major hotel.
1
0.9
0.8
0.7 -
0.6 -
0.5
0.4 -
0.3 -
0.2 -
0.1
0
March April May June July August
Project Completion Time
FIGURE 5.3-1: HOTEL OWNER'S UTILITY FUNCTION FOR THE TIME OF COMPLETION OF A PROJECT
(NORTHERN HEMISPHERE, SUMMER RESORT)
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Two basic assumptions govern the validity and applicability of the discussed
methodology, and they are related to these elements of value.
1ST ASsUMPTION: PREFERENCE INDEPENDENCE APPLIES
This means that if two alternatives share the same value for one of the
attributes, then, changing the level of the shared value should not change the
ranking (or relative preference) of the two alternatives. Note that the same
assumption exists for the weighted sum model (see Section 5.2.2).
2 ND ASsUMPTION: UTILITY INDEPENDENCE APPLIES
The assumption of utility independence states that preference between a
lottery and a certainty equivalent for one attribute x, does not depend on the
levels of the other attributes xj. Symbolically,
if
x , - (x',,p;x",) for one set of x'j, j i
then
xi - (x' ,,p; x", ) for all levels of x'3 , j # i
This assumption holds most of the time, when the first assumption holds. The
two assumptions stated imply that the utility function of the owner will be of
the form
KU(x) +1= (Kk1U(x1 ) + 1)
i=1
For two attributes, the equation above simplifies to
u(x 1, x 2) = k1u1(x1) + k2 u2(x 2 ) + k3u1(x 1)u1(x 1)
where k3 = Kk1k2
The factor K expresses the interaction between attributes, i.e., the degree to
which the existence of two attributes simultaneously adds larger value than the
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sum of values from the existence of each attribute separately. K can be
computed from
n
K +1= H(Kk, +1)
i=1
Observe that, for Ik = 1 .0 , K = 0, which leads to the simple additive model:
U(x) = >Lk,U(x,)
This simple model is perfectly valid when another condition also holds: That of
additive independence. Additive independence may be hard to prove in the
case of termination of construction contracts. Indications for its validity come
from the existence of liquidated damages clauses in contracts, according to the
letter of which, the owner is able to determine a monetary value for each day
of delay on the project, so that it is indifferent between the timely and
delayed completion. The claim that an owner may be indifferent between a
GMP and a unit price contract for a particular project also supports this
assumption. If additive independence truly holds, then the owner's utility
function (for two attributes) further simplifies to:
u(x 1, x 2 ) = k1u1(x 1) + k2 u2 (x 2 )
For this discussion we will assume that additive independence does not hold.
To illustrate, we are saying that, for an owner, delivering on time and under
budget has much greater value than the sum of values from only delivering on
time or only delivering under budget. In reality, this issue remains to be
examined, but as it will not affect the rest of the discussion, we will follow the
general formulation above.
Having established these basic assumptions and framework, using multi-
attribute utility analysis for evaluating construction contract termination is
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almost trivial. What is not trivial, but is outside the scope of this work, is the
determination of the owner's utility functions with respect to the attributes
mentioned above: cost, schedule, quality, social impact and the natural
environment.
5.3.2DECISION-MAKING FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION
A formal decision analysis framework can now be used to evaluate contract
termination. Organizing a complete model and arriving at a decision will be
illustrated by an example in the next chapter. In this section, the rationale of
the decision analysis framework is presented by means of an influence diagram.
Influence diagrams are an alternative way of representing a decision tree. It
does not contain the same information (at least as a schematic), but it provides
better communication of the problem's structure.
In influence diagrams, decision nodes are represented by squares, chance
nodes are represented by ovals, and end nodes are represented by diamonds.
Double oval nodes denote variables in the model (probabilistic or
deterministic). The arcs between nodes indicate one or more of three possible
relationships:
1. A probabilistic influence, for which different possible outcomes at the
first node require different enumerations of the probabilities on the
second
2. A value influence, for which the value of a node (cost or profit, for
instance) differs based on the outcome of another node,
3. A structural influence, which symbolically denotes some way of
asymmetry in the corresponding tree.
The influence diagram shown in Figure 5.3-2 is created to assist policy design
during some phases of the six-step DART framework (Figure 4.2-2). This gives
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the model a time dimension and, in a realistic situation, can even provide
guidance for effective negotiations. Some termination factors for default have
also been included in Figure 5.3-2 to show the relation of the decision-making
process with the monitoring phase.
Terminate Now?
Mutual Termination
Seek Arbitration
Result of
Arbitration Owner's
Interference
Liquidated
Pursue Litigation Damages
Result of Percent
Litigation CompletedWork
AppealAppeal other Contractors
FIGURE 5.3-2: INFLUENCE DIAGRAM EXAMPLE IN TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS & CRITIQUE
Arriving at the optimal evaluation models for contract termination, several
other decision and evaluation models were considered:
1. Thomas Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 213
2. The weighted sum method
3. Outranking Methods
4. The additive value model
5. A simple real options approach
Multi-attribute utility functions with decision analysis was selected in the end,
as the best approach for the problem in hand. This choice was not made from a
mathematical or decision analysis viewpoint, but from a project manager's or
an owner's standpoint. It was selected because it is thought to better capture
the complexities of construction contract termination, while being flexible to
adopt to the diversity of practical situations. A brief account of the reasons
why decision analysis is thought to be appropriate for contract termination
follows:
o Non-linear preference & utility functions: Construction owners will
typically show high non-linearity in their preferences and utilities. In most
occasions, cost- and schedule-associated utilities will even show double
convexity, while quality, environmental and sociopolitical utility functions
will often exhibit risk aversion.
o Interaction: The general multi-attribute model allows extensive interaction
between utility functions. This feature allows the modeler to capture
project-specific factors and account for them in the model.
o Clarity: Decision analysis is fairly easy to present and comment on. Mistakes
and assumptions are communicated more easily than in the other methods.
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o Time Dimension: Decision analysis assumes a specific sequence of different
decisions and "events of nature," which, apart from being close to practical
situations, permits the owner to weave the decision-making process with
other elements of construction practice, such as dispute resolution and
avoidance techniques.
o Communication: The decision to terminate is an inter-disciplinary one. It
requires the input and direction of the owner representative, the engineer,
the project manager and a legal and financial advisor. This method
facilitates communication on the decision model and parameters between
stakeholders or members of the owner organization. A decision model
allows the expertise of the involved stakeholders to be easily mapped,
giving the decision makers the flexibility of examining its potential courses
of action formally and from different perspectives.
o Learning: Building a model also provides insight into its structure and
allows learning about the project. Even if the model itself does not prove to
be useful, building the model alone constitutes an invaluable learning
process.
o Sensitivity Analysis: Decision analysis allows for extensive sensitivity
analysis on the results, which increases their robustness and collective
appeal within the organization.
o Policy Design: The clarity and embedded time dimension of the model, as
well as the potential incorporation of a variety of factors from the entire
project ecosystem allows the decision makers to design effective policies.
On the other hand, one of the major drawbacks of full decision analysis,
especially in this context, is its complexity and lack of "automation." The
models used in R&D projects are, for the most part, easy and fast to
implement, providing an "automatic" decision support system. The increased
accuracy and flexibility of decision analysis builds on increased complexity and
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requires experience on behalf of the decision-maker. Finally, it is sensitive to a
variety of input parameters, such as the owner's utility functions which are not
discussed here. Most of these parameters are difficult to obtain in a systematic
and reliable way, thus making the method less reliable itself.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this last Chapter, a case study of a terminated contract between a
contractor and a subcontractor is presented. A preliminary and extendable
decision model is built for the case, using the framework and methodology
prior established. For lack of extensive information on the case the analysis
aims to present a possible applicable framework for termination factors.
Morrison-Knudsen Corporation (MK), a federal contractor, terminated its
subcontractor, Ground Improvement Techniques (GIT), for an alleged default,
and sued GIT for damages. GIT counterclaimed for wrongful termination.
GIT's claimed damages included payment for completed work under the
subcontract, equitable adjustments to the subcontract price for increased costs
caused by MK, damages claimed by lower-tier subcontractors, and attorney's
fees. MK unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law, claiming
insufficiencies in GIT's evidence of damages and of MK's liability. A jury found
the termination wrongful and awarded GIT roughly half the damages claimed.
6.2 BACKGROUND
The United States Department of Energy hired MK in 1983 to manage its
Uranium Mill Tailing Remedial Action (UMTRA) project, a cleanup of radioactive
mill tailings at sites around the country. MK subcontracted with GIT in March
1995 to clean up the Slick Rock, Colorado, site. GIT hired several lower-tier
subcontractors ("subs"), including R.N. Robinson & Son, for excavation; Bogue
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Construction, for trucks; Keers Environmental, for asbestos abatement; and GA
Western, for bridge work.
The MK-GIT Subcontract ("the contract") obligated GIT to complete the project
by December 1996. The contract price was roughly $9.3 million. The contract
incorporated almost verbatim several standard federal clauses for fixed-price
construction contracts, including clauses governing terminations for default
and convenience. It also incorporated by reference the federal regulations
governing the compensability of contractors' costs in the event of a
termination for convenience. The contract provided that the law applicable to
government procurement would govern all substantive issues in any litigation.
The project did not go well. GIT and its subs encountered delays, difficulties,
and increased costs. GIT attributed these to MK's defective specifications,
failure to timely secure permits, rigid interpretation of specifications and
safety requirements, and propensity to reject proposed work plans. During the
contract's performance, GIT requested extra compensation and extensions of
time because of delays to, changes in, and increased costs of the work which
GIT attributed to MK. GIT's central theory is that its plan to complete the
project before the deadline displeased MK, who could not then earn the
maximum possible fees from DOE. MK, in GIT's view, thus sought to hinder and
delay the work. MK, on the other hand, attributed the delays and increased
costs to errors, omissions, and delinquencies by GIT and its subs.
In September 1995 MK terminated GIT for default. The contract allowed MK to
do so if GIT was not prosecuting the work with a diligence that would ensure its
timely completion. MK simultaneously sued GIT for damages caused by its
alleged default. While requiring GIT to cease work and vacate the site, MK also
directed it to perform certain cleanup work and leave certain equipment
behind. MK allegedly retained and used that equipment during the ensuing
litigation. After the termination, MK denied almost all of GIT's requests for
change orders to increase its compensation under the contract. MK also failed
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to pay GIT for various parts of the completed work and for the post-termination
work and retention of equipment.
GIT protested the termination and urged MK to let it complete the project or
bid on the re-procurement of the work. MK ignored these requests. In
February 1996 GIT counterclaimed for wrongful termination, seeking damages
in the form of payment for completed work under the contract and
compensation for additional costs occasioned by MK and not contemplated by
the contract.
Contemporaneously, the subs were demanding payment from GIT. After Keers
filed suit, GIT settled its claims. At the time of the GIT-MK trial, however, GIT
was still involved in litigation with Robinson and had not settled with or paid
Bogue or GA Western. In its counterclaim, GIT also sought damages on behalf
of the subs.
The district court eventually set trial for November 1996. In October 1996 GIT
supplemented its pretrial damages disclosure, increasing the amount claimed
from roughly $8.4 to $11.4 million and increasing the number of categories of
damages. MK repeatedly but unsuccessfully challenged the supplementation,
arguing that GIT had changed its damage theory just weeks before trial and
was using previously undisclosed documentation.
Twelve days before trial, the court assigned the case to a new judge. That
judge presided over a three-week trial, which focused on whether MK's
termination of GIT had been wrongful. GIT presented one witness, its
secretary/treasurer, Kip Cooper, to explain its damage exhibits and claims.
Before the court submitted the case to the jury, MK filed several motions for
judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). MK
made several challenges to GIT's damage evidence. It argued, inter alia, that
GIT had not presented evidence of the types of damages allowed by the
contract, or of causation, or of its attorney's fees. The court denied MK's
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motions. MK also argued in a jury-instruction conference that the contract
barred GIT from recovering on behalf of subs whose claims GIT had not settled
and paid. The court rejected MK's proposed jury instruction to that effect.
The jury found the termination wrongful and awarded GIT $5.6 million. MK
then renewed most of its motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50(b), and the court denied them again.
On appeal, the court of appeals rejected MK's challenge to the liability verdict
but reversed the damage award. GIT's evidence of several of its categories of
damages was insufficient, and its claims on behalf of its lower-tier
subcontractors were premature, as GIT had not yet itself settled with all of its
subcontractors. Because the jury returned a general verdict, the court of
appeals could not determine whether any parts of the jury's award were for
allowable categories of damages supported by sufficient evidence. Thus, it
vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of
damages.
6.2.1 APPLICABLE LAW AND CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
The contract's default-termination clause, GP 56, incorporated essentially
verbatim the standard federal Default clause for fixed-price construction
contracts. That clause is part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation System
(FAR). As incorporated in the contract, the clause allowed MK to terminate GIT
if the work had been delayed, not for excusable reasons, but by GIT's lack of
diligence:
1. If [GIT] refuses or fails to prosecute the work . .. with the diligence that will
ensure its completion within the time specified in this Subcontract, including any
extension . . . [MK] may . . . terminate [GIT's] right to proceed . . ..
2. [GIT]'s right to proceed shall not be terminated nor [GIT] charged with damages
under this article, if the delay in completing the work arises from causes . . .
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of [GIT].
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The clause further provided that a wrongful default-termination would be
treated as a termination for convenience:
3. If, after termination it is determined that [GIT] was not in default or that the delay
was excusable, the rights and obligations of the parties will be the same as if the
termination had been issued for the convenience of the Government. I
The contract's Disputes clause, GP 41, provides that "any substantive issue of
law in [litigation concerning the Contract] shall be determined in accordance
with the body of law applicable to procurement of goods and services by the
Government." According to this clause, and after the parties proposed
different instructions for the jury for the interpretation of delays, the court
decided that six elements of a compensable delay were required by GIT in
order to prove that MK refused it the additional time to complete the project
that a delay made necessary:
GIT must prove each of the following elements
1. GIT was delayed or accelerated in its performance;
2. The delay was beyond the control of GIT;
3. The delay was without the fault or negligence of GIT;
4. [MK's] conduct in causing the delay was not authorized by the subcontract;
5. GIT incurred additional costs as a direct result of the delay;
6. GIT complied with the written notice provisions of the subcontract [or proved an
excuse for having failed to do so].
Finally, the issue of damages owed by MK to GIT was governed by the
contract's termination-for-convenience clause, the termination-for-default
clause, and common law. GP 55H, part of the contract's termination-for-
convenience clause, provided that "The cost principles and procedures of FAR,
Part 31 shall govern all costs claimed, agreed to, or determined under this
article." Under those principles, as interpreted in the decisions of the federal
courts and boards of contract appeals which handle most federal-contracting
disputes, GIT bore the burden of proving damages in accord with the contract
"with sufficient certainty so that the determination of the amount of damages
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will be more than mere speculation." MK, on the other hand, was not obliged
to present evidence attacking items of damages if GIT had not made a prima
facie showing that the items were property included in its claim.
Worth mentioning here, is a one major difference between common-law
damages for breach of contract and termination-for-convenience damages in
federal contracting law. Common-law damages may include anticipated profits
on work that a contractor was to perform under the terminated part of a
contract. Convenience-termination damages under federal-contracting law may
not.
6.2.2COURT PROCEEDINGS (HIGHLIGHTS)
The case went under three extensive and complex trials totally. As mentioned
above, at the first trial the jury found the termination wrongful and awarded
GIT $5.6 million. Upon MK's appeal, the court reversed the damage award, and
referred the case to a third trial to be held at a district court regarding the
issue of damages alone. To document the analysis which follows, the issues
brought up at the appeals court are mentioned briefly, along with a summary
of the court's stand on them. The focus is on those issues more related to the
actual project and not on the clearly legal procedures that led the court to its
decision. The purpose of this section is to provide material on issues that could
perhaps have been foreseen by MK at the time the decision to terminate was
made.
The sole issue of liability at the initial trial was whether the default-
termination was wrongful. By terminating GIT, MK indicated a belief that GIT
was so far behind schedule, without adequate excuse, as to show a lack of
diligence that made the project's timely completion uncertain. The
termination was proper if such a belief was reasonable. In challenging the
termination, GIT claimed that it had been entitled to extensions of time for
various "excusable delays." The initial verdict may have been based on the fact
that GIT was rightfully entitled to at least one excusable delay. This is the
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reason why the definition of excusable delays was revisited in court and its
determination became the subject of a court instruction (see Section 6.2.1).
Because the first trial focused solely on whether the termination was wrongful,
the issue of damages owed by MK to GIT was not settled to the satisfaction of
MK. For purposes of analysis, it is appropriate to divide GIT's total claim of
roughly $11.35 million into equitable adjustments ($3 million), lower-tier
subcontractor claims ($3.7 million), attorney's fees ($1.35 million), unpaid
contract work and post-termination equipment expenses and work ($1.9
million), and other ($1.4 million). All figures include overhead, profit, and
bond. However, GIT offered no admissible evidence whatsoever to support its
claim of roughly $1.35 million for attorney's fees. GIT also did not offer
sufficient evidence to support its claims for roughly $3 million in equitable
adjustments to the contract. Nor did it offer sufficient evidence of most if not
all of the roughly $3.7 million in damages it claimed on behalf of its subs.
Although the parties do not seem to dispute GIT's right to damages for work
that the contract required, and that GIT performed, but for which MK did not
pay, MK's argument with regard to damages primarily initiated from GIT's
funding most of its damage evidence on a common-law theory of damages
which was fundamentally inconsistent with the contract and the FAR. It did so,
however, as part of its claim that the termination was not merely wrongful but
also in bad faith. If GIT proved bad faith, it would recover full common-law
damages for breach of contract. However, the court of appeals declined to
submit a bad-faith claim to the jury, and GIT was forced to remove anticipated
profits from its claim and adhere to damages recoverable under termination-
for-convenience clause.
Instead, GIT had to obtain damages by proving entitlement to equitable
adjustments to the contract price. An equitable adjustment is a change in
contract price. It compensates a contractor for increased costs reasonably
incurred because the government (or, in this case, MK) increased the amount
or difficulty of work required by the contract, or delayed or accelerated that
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work. Some equitable adjustments are for work added by formal change
orders. The contract included a standard clause allowing such orders. Other
equitable adjustments result from "constructive changes," which occur when
the government does something to increase a contractor's costs without issuing
a formal change order.
To prove that it is entitled to an equitable adjustment, a contractor must show
liability, causation, and injury. It must prove that the government somehow
delayed, accelerated, augmented, or complicated the work, and thereby
caused the contractor to incur specific additional costs. The contractor must
not only prove that the government specifically caused its increased costs, but
must prove that those costs were reasonable, allowable, and allocable to the
contract. The contractor bears the burden of proof on all of those factors. GIT
presented very little and insufficient evidence to show how MK's actions
specifically caused GIT to incur the costs claimed in its damage claims.
Finally, an important issue raised, which should also have been foreseen at the
time of the termination decision, was the settlement between GIT and its
subcontractors. The contract allowed MK to terminate GIT either for
convenience or default. If MK terminated GIT for default and a court found the
termination wrongful, then the termination would convert to one for
convenience. The standard termination-for-convenience clause for fixed-price
construction contracts, established MK's and GIT's duties after such a
termination. The clause obliged GIT to terminate its subcontracts, entertain
termination-settlement proposals from its subs, and settle their claims. GIT
would then make its own termination-settlement proposal to MK, and they
would negotiate a settlement. GIT's proposal to MK would presumably include
the costs it had incurred in settling and paying its subs' claims.
Because MK terminated GIT for default, however, the parties did not follow
that procedure. GIT never settled with or paid three of its four subs. The
contract set forth MK's obligations if it terminated GIT for convenience but
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then could not reach a settlement with GIT. Among scenarios contemplated by
the contract, that is the closest analogue to what occurred. For work
performed before termination, the contract obliged MK to pay GIT:
1 The cost of this work.
2. The cost of settling and paying termination settlement proposals under terminated
subcontracts that are property chargeable to the terminated portion of the
[contract] if not included in subparagraph above.
MK argued that the contract barred GIT from recovering on its subs' claims
unless it has "settled and paid" those claims, which it had not. The court of
appeals did not reach a conclusion regarding subcontractor claims, despite the
extensive legal literature referenced in the courtroom.
The case was forwarded to a new trial, as mentioned above, the scope of which
was only the damages claimed by GIT on attorney's fees, equitable adjustment
and subcontractor claims. These three issues should have been raised (and
perhaps were raised) by MK at the time of the decision to terminate its
contract with GIT.
6.3 ANALYSIS
The literature on this case is very extensive, and goes into great depths in the
governing legal and contractual provisions. To analyze the case thoroughly
would require much greater knowledge of the facts than was obtainable.
Nevertheless, an effort if made to identify the value elements of importance
mentioned in Table 4.2-I that played an important role in this case.
6.3.1 THE MONITORING FRAMEWORK - VALUE ELEMENTS
In this case, it is important that termination was not caused by the owner
directly. This is a case of termination between a contractor and its
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subcontractor. Therefore, insight to the goals and values of both can be gained
from re-examination of Table 4.1-I, part of which is presented modified below.
TABLE 6.3-1: ALIGNMENT OF CONTRACTOR'S - SUBCONTRACTOR'S INTERESTS IN THE MK v GIT CASE
. Chieve profit and other financial gains
.-- Satisfy client and generate repeated business
"ibotaco . Manage cash flow
I Objctiv. Limit tong term liability
.Develop employees and create internal satisfaction
. Complete the project within schedule
. Maintain a high level of quality
. Execute the project safely, without wasted time or accidents
. Minimize claims and litigation
From the history of the litigation, it may be hypothesized that the contractor's
motives may have been directed heavily towards maximizing profits in the
expense of conformance to the schedule. Lacking access to contractual
documents though, we are unable to determine the clauses that provided
ground for such an incentive. Apparently, however, this misalignment of
incentives may have initiated the problems that led to termination. From the
background of the case, the most significant termination factors identified are
shown in Table 6.3-11.
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TABLE 6.3-11: RELEVANT TERMINATION FACTORS FOR MK
. Significant cost overruns due to the contractor's performance, which
the owner will bear based on the contractual agreement.
. Any action of the contractor that increases the costs to the owner in
the future or increases the risk of potential such costs, regardless of
conformity to the contract.
. Defective Specifications.
. Percentage of subcontracted work.
. The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
mentioned above.
. The uncertain costs of litigation deriving from termination.
. The cost and availability of other contractors who may take over.
. Financial state of subcontracts under the main contract and
contractual obligations of the owner against them.
. Significant non-conformance to the schedule, with little hope of
conformance in the future, corresponding to large costs to the
owner.
. Critical delays for which the contractor, subcontractors, material
suppliers or labor unions are directly responsible.
. The owner's interference and responsibility for delays.
. Excusable/non-excusable, Compensable / non-Compensable delays
. Unforseeability of critical delays
. Percent of completed and paid work under the contract.
. The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
- - mentioned above.
. Unique technical expertise of the contractor.
" Contractor commitment and cooperation.
. Adversary Intent or Fraud: Once the courts have determined that a
contract exists, they are bound to find that the contract imposes
obligations of good faith, cooperation and fair dealing.
. The owner's conduct during the project in relation to the events
mentioned above.
The extensive list of monitoring factors in Table 4.2-1 has been decreased to
include those factors that, according to the historical background of the case
and litigation, might have been known from the initiation of the decision to
terminate. Care has been taken to account for the factors that a decision-
maker would have been able to predict with the information (we assume)
he/she had in hand at that time.
In selecting the appropriate termination factors, we assumed that the decision
process started in September 1995, right before the termination decision. At
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that time the project was already around 30% through its official schedule (22
months). Also, we will assume that it is not true that GIT's plan was to
complete the project before its required deadline, which displeased MK, and
MK in turn, caused some of GIT's delays12. This assumption is likely, since GIT
was not able to prove bad faith on behalf of MK.
Finally, for simplicity and because no contrary information is available, it is
assumed that the project in hand is a "commodity-type" project, one for which
quality is not a significant issue. On the other hand, environmental impact and
sociopolitical effects could be important potentially, but no information to
support this is available. Therefore, for the purpose of building the list of
monitoring factors, it has been ignored.
12 Again, it should be noted that these are assumptions made for the purpose of the
illustration. No hard evidence exists to prove such claims or refute them.
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